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I. INTRODUCTION 
Physician discipline in California is a 
code blue emergency. The system cannot 
and does not protect Californians from 
incompetent medical practice. It is effect-
ively moribund. 
Each year, 50,000-80,000 phone calls 
come to the Board of Medical Quality 
Assurance (BMQA), which regulates 
physicians. Uncoordinated complaint 
handlers lacking medical or legal experi-
ence cull from these calls a current level 
of 6,000 annual complaints about phy-
sician competence, sobriety, or honesty 
within BMQA's discipline jurisdiction. 
One-half of these are then eliminated as 
without merit, or by informal warning 
phone calls or conferences with the 
accused physicians. Of the current level 
of 2,500-3,000 per year considered seri-
ous enough for formal investigation, 109 
resulted in formal accusation or hearing 
in fiscal year 1987-88. All but those 109 
were closed, routed, or "resolved" in 
secrecy. Thirty of those 109 were later 
dismissed or withdrawn. 
The 79 formal accusations pursued 
resulted in the revocation of 27 licenses 
during 1987-88, down from 40 in 1986-
87. License suspensions were at 15 in 
1987-88, down from 18 in 1986-87. 
Levels of both revocations and suspen-
sions for 1988-89 appear to be even 
lower yet. A grand total of 12 physicians 
were subject to any discipline (revoca-
tion, suspension, or probation) in 1987-
88 for incompetence, and 5 for self-
abuse of drugs or alcohol. These levels 
are typical, not aberrational statistics. 
* The author is a tenured law pro-
fessor at the University of San Diego 
School of Law and Director of the 
Center for Public Interest Law. Since 
January 1987, Professor Fellmeth has 
served as the State Bar Discipline Moni-
tor pursuant to section 6086.9 of the 
Business and Professions Code. Assisting 
in the research, drafting, and editing of 
this report were CPIL staff counsel 
James R. Wheaton, Julianne B. D'Angelo, 
and Kate G. Turnbull. 
These performance levels cover 70,000 
licensed physicians currently practicing 
in California. Many more than the 27 
physicians whose licenses were revoked 
in I 987-88 are annually convicted of 
multiple felonies. Seven hundred fifteen 
(715) physicians and health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs) were either ad-
judged liable for malpractice or agreed 
to settlements in excess of $30,000 in 
1987-88, up 50% from 457 in 1984-85. 
Two hundred forty-nine (249) physicians 
had their privileges suspended or re-
voked by hospitals for reasons of drug 
impairment or medical incompetence 
in 1987-88, a record number. The 
American Medical Association (AMA) 
estimates that 7,000-10,000 currently 
practicing physicians in California are 
so severely impaired that they cannot 
safely practice medicine. Malpractice 
premiums allegedly paid due to claims 
and judgments caused by incompetent 
practice have increased to the $50,000-
$80,000 per year range for many physi-
cians and most surgeons. Over the past 
five years, while the number of physi-
cians has increased from 60,000 to 
70,000, complaints have increased from 
just over 4,000 per year to 6,000. But 
public discipline has declined to trivial 
levels. 
This system of "public protection" is 
now in its final death from a choking 
backlog. At this moment, 721 facially 
meritorious cases that are serious enough 
for formal investigation sit in files un-
assigned. Most of these cases are "Pri-
ority I" cases; that is, they involve an 
immediate threat to patient health. Six 
hundred fifty-nine (659) more are assign-
ed and remain in additional investigator 
backlogs (now under investigation for 
more than six months without resolu-
tion). Another 1,000 are in intake back-
log. None of these physicians are subject 
to interim suspension. Since 1985-86, 
only three temporary restraining orders 
have been issued to prevent physician 
practice during the three to four years 
of a typical proceeding, which stretches 
to six to ten years where the accused 
physician contests the discipline in court. 
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The discipline system is operated by 
people who are not properly trained to 
make the decisions demanded, and is 
controlled at every critical step by cur-
rently practicing physicians who elimin-
ate almost every case. To be precise, 
more than 97% of facially valid com-
plaints never see the light of day. The 
attitude of those making these decisions 
is openly solicitous of the physician. 
While physician rehabilitation is one 
statutory goal, it is the preoccupation of 
the current system. The profession and 
current administration, to some extent 
over Board and staff objection, have 
resisted raising physician licensing fees 
above the current levels of $145 per 
year. Current fees assessed for discipline 
are less than the amount spent on mal-
practice premiums for six hours of typi-
cal practice. The discipline budget 
proposed no additional positions for 
1989. Only two-and-one-half positions 
have been added in the last five years. 
For the past year, the Center for 
Public Interest Law (CPIL) has conduct-
ed a comprehensive investigation of 
BMQA's physician discipline system. 
On April 5, 1989, CPIL issued its initial 
report, which documents major deficien-
cies throughout the system and recom-
mends substantial structural and admin-
istrative changes. The statistics cited in 
the report are taken directly from the 
files of BMQA. 1 What follows is a con-
densed version of that report. CPIL's 
major recommendations are highlighted 
in bold print. 
II. CURRENT OPERATIONAL 
MODEL FOR THE DISCIPLINE 
OF PHYSICIANS AND ALLIED 
HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 
A. Structure 
BMQA operates under the Depart-
ment of Consumer Affairs within the 
executive branch of California state 
government. It is a quasi-independent 
regulatory agency exercising broad 
powers under the Medical Practice Act 
(Business and Professions Code section 
2 
2000 et seq.) and other statutes designed 
to assure competent and honest delivery 
of medical care to consumers in Cali-
fornia. BMQA includes nineteen mem-
bers appointed to four-year terms. By 
provision of law, twelve of those mem-
bers must be currently practicing physi-
cians. Hence, members of the profession 
directly control the state agency and 
exercise police powers under broad au-
thority on behalf of the general public 
and for its protection. 
The Board is separated into three 
autonomous divisions: the Division of 
Allied Health Professions (DAHP), the 
Division of Licensing (DOL), and the 
Division of Medical Quality (DMQ). 
DMQ consists of seven BMQA members 
and meets approximately every three 
months. The Board members constitut-
ing DMQ oversee an enforcement pro-
gram and exercise authority comparable 
to that exercised by other boards or 
commissions in California state govern-
ment. That is, the critical rulemaking 
and adjudicative decisions made by 
DMQ members operate effectively as 
final state determinations. 
The Division of Allied Health Pro-
fessions includes eight separate examin-
ing committees which license non-physi-
cian health care providers. These eight 
committees regulate acupuncturists, 
physical therapists, physician's assist-
ants, hearing aid dispensers, podiatrists, 
psychologists, speech pathologists/ audio-
logists, and respiratory care therapists. 
In addition, medical assistants, registered 
dispensing opticians, research psycho-
analysts, and contact lens dispensers are 
also directly regulated by DAHP. The 
enforcement of the Medical Practice Act 
as to these allied health professionals is 
assumed by their respective committees 
under BMQA. DMQ provides investiga-
tive services and findings within its 
disciplinary operation to these allied 
health committees for action in the ad-
ministrative adjudicative process. 
B. Statutory Duty 
The Medical Practice Act provides 
general statutory authority under which 
DMQ exercises considerable rulemaking 
powers and directs the discipline/ en-
forcement function. Under the statute, 
DMQ is directly responsible for the in-
vestigation of allied health professionals, 
and for the investigation and final ad-
judicative outcome of the following 
kinds of abuse in medical practice: (1) 
gross negligence; (2) incompetence; (3) 
excessive prescribing or administering 
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of drugs or treatment; (4) the conviction 
of a crime; (5) a conviction under, or 
compromise of, a narcotics or drug stat-
ute; (6) misuse of dangerous drugs, nar-
cotics, or alcohol; (7) furnishing drugs 
to addicts contrary to law; (8) prescrib-
ing dangerous drugs without a prior 
medical examination; (9) medical illness; 
and (10) intoxication while attending a 
patient. 
The statutory command to DMQ is 
protection of the public from physician 
incompetence, dishonesty, or alcohol/ 
drug abuse (whether by the physician or 
improper facilitation of private use). No 
other profession or trade regulated by 
the state is more justifiably restrained 
for assured quality of care than the 
medical profession. Consumers entrust 
their lives, personal health, and welfare 
to physicians to a degree unknown in 
other professional relationships. A lack 
of competence may result in irreparable 
harm to consumers. To preclude that 
harm, the state has interposed signifi-
cant barriers to entry into the profes-
sion. The accreditation of medical 
schools, a difficult series of examina-
tions, and residency requirements in 
which actual performance is reviewed, 
all predate final licensure by BMQA. 
Despite the initial difficulty in secur-
ing licensure, the medical license is a 
general license unrelated to the actual 
area of medicine likely to be practiced. 
Although medical practice is highly 
specialized in nature, a general medical 
license is granted, allowing-for pur-
poses of state control-practice in any 
or a large number of medical fields. 
There is no required post-licensure re-
testing. Continuing education require-
ments are minimal. There is no required 
medical malpractice coverage guarantee-
ing recovery to patients harmed by in-
competent physicians. 
A supplemental series of private sec-
tor admission and certification stand-
ards exists, which may serve some theo-
retical competence-enhancing purpose. 
"Board certification" standards have 
been established for specialties. These 
do not preclude practice in those areas 
by others, but may give some warning 
to informed patients about competence. 
Most important, hospital privileges must 
be obtained and retained by a physician 
in order to gain the access to hospital or 
related facilities most specialties require. 
This last control operates beyond the 
scope of the state and is subject to the 
limitations discussed below. 
The burden on the regulatory agency 
to ensure honest and competent physi-
cian services, relied upon by consumers, 
is rightfully heavy. This responsibility is 
enhanced by the irreparable nature of 
the failure to ensure that competence, 
by the lack of post-licensure quality con-
trol, and by the intrusion of private 
decisionmakers in the disallowance of 
practice by their peers. 
C. Present Procedure (Theoretical) 
1. Outreach: Consumer Complaints. 
Consumers or patients account for over 
50% of the complaints received by DMQ 
about physicians and allied health pro-
fessionals. Complaints are received at 
one of the seven regional offices of 
DMQ. Six of these offices (Torrance, 
Woodland Hills, San Bernardino, Santa 
Ana, Sacramento, and San Mateo) have 
one consumer services representative 
(CSR) who serves an initial intake 
function. Operating under the general 
supervision of the Regional Office Super-
visor and a Medical Consultant appoint-
ed for each region, the CSR evaluates 
the case upon intake. The CSR may 
close the complaint immediately as 
"mediated, negotiated, settled or dis-
missed." Complaints closed by the CSR 
are presumptively "without merit" and 
are automatically purged, without re-
view, from DMQ's records after thirty 
days. Complaints relevant to allied 
health professionals may be referred to 
their respective committee or enforce-
ment personnel as appropriate. Allega-
tions which, if true, constitute violations 
of the Medical Practice Act, may be 
referred for investigation. 
2. Other Reporting. In addition to 
receiving consumer complaints, DMQ 
receives reports on criminal convictions 
of licensees. DMQ may also receive so-
called "section 805" (of the Business and 
Professions Code) reports regarding the 
denial, restriction, or revocation of hos-
pital privileges. These reports are filed 
with DMQ by professional liability insur-
ers (section 801), uninsured licensees or 
their counsel (section 802), clerks of the 
court (section 803), and peer review en-
tities (section 805). Medical malpractice 
reports (sections 801-03) notify the Board 
when a malpractice case judgment, settle-
ment, or arbitration award against a 
physician exceeds $30,000. Regional 
Medical Consultants review each report 
to determine whether DMQ investiga-
tion is warranted. Note that although 
malpractice awards may be based on 
simple negligence, disciplinary action by 
BMQA requires gross negligence or re-
peated negligent acts. 
Section 805 reports require the chief 
of the medical staff of any organized 
l 
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system where physicians, clinical psy-
chologists, or podiatrists work to notify 
BMQA when any licensed physician is 
denied staff privileges, has had privileges 
limited, or is removed from the staff. 
Section 805 also requires that the cov-
ered facilities request relevant infor-
mation from the Board regarding any 
licensed physician prior to granting or 
renewing staff privileges. 
DMQ also receives complaints from 
other government agencies including the 
federal Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (DEA), the state Department of 
Health Services, the state Board of Phar-
macy, and district attorneys (usually 
related to Medi-Cal fraud or drug viola-
tions). 
3. Consumer Services Representa-
tives (CSRs). Within ten days of the 
receipt of a complaint from a consumer, 
the CSR is to acknowledge receipt of 
that complaint. The flow chart for the 
typical complaint is presented in Exhibit 
1 (at the end of this article). The case 
will be assigned a priority from I to 4. 
Up until February 1989,2 the highest 
priority is given to those complaints 
which, if proven, demonstrate a high 
potential for public harm. Complaints 
in this category include gross negligence, 
sexual abuse, incompetence, substance 
abuse, mental illness, and those which 
allege criminal behavior. These high-
priority cases are to be assigned to an 
investigator within thirty days and the 
investigation is to be completed within 
180 days. 
The next priority classification en-
compasses complaints which require 
additional information before a decision 
can be made regarding the disposition 
of the case. Until a decision is made, 
these cases are handled by the CSR, the 
Regional Supervisor, and the Medical 
Consultant. 
Complaints which, even if proven, 
would probably not result in discipline 
are within the third priority. In such 
cases, merely bringing the complaint to 
the attention of the physician may pre-
vent more serious problems in the future. 
These cases are not referred for investi-
gation, but are addressed through infor-
mation and warning letters. 
The lowest priority is given to com-
plaints which do not involve patient 
care issues and appear to be the least 
serious in nature. Most of these com-
plaints can be resolved through appro-
priate referrals and warning letters. 
4. Regional Medical Consultant/ 
Supervising Investigator. Where the 
CSR evaluation indicates appropriate 
jurisdiction for DMQ enforcement, the 
FEATURE ARTICLE 
case will be reviewed by a Regional 
Medical Consultant and/or a Super-
vising Investigator. The Supervising 
Investigator may refer the matter to 
another agency or close it as without 
merit. A case investigation tracking 
system (CITS) will be checked to deter-
mine whether any existing investigations 
are under way or whether prior disci-
pline may be relevant, before assigning 
it for formal investigation. 
5. Regional Supervisor/ Opening of 
Investigation. If the Regional Super-
vising Investigator finds that the com-
plaint warrants formal investigation, 
he/she may order the opening of a 
formal investigative file. A file is opened 
and one of approximately 39 investi-
gators is assigned to the case. Investiga-
tors are largely concentrated in Los An-
geles and San Mateo; the other offices 
have from one to five investigators. The 
investigator communicates with the ac-
cused physician, obtains medical records, 
commences an investigation, and files 
regularly required progress reports at 
one- or two-month intervals. 
6. Review by Regional Medical Con-
sultant. DMQ includes a Chief Medical 
Consultant and Regional Medical Con-
sultants operating from several of the 
DMQ regions noted above. These medi-
cal consultants are generally current or 
recent practicing physicians and operate 
out of six of the eight regions. A Region-
al Medical Consultant is relied upon by 
DMQ for critical decisions and may, 
with the agreement of the Supervising 
Investigator, close a case, refer it to an 
expert panel for recommendation, or 
may engage in what is termed a "physi-
cian performance conference." This latter 
represents an opportunity for the con-
sultant to informally review the problem 
with the physician and to receive assur-
ances of behavior modification in the 
future. The case may also be referred to 
a Medical Quality Review Committee 
(MQRC) for non-disciplinary review. 
Finally, the consultant may recommend 
formal discipline. 
7. Medical Quality Review Commit-
tees (MQRCs). Pursuant to sections 
2320 and 2332 of the Business and Profes-
sions Code, DMQ has created fourteen 
Medical Quality Review Committees in 
various regions throughout the state. 
These MQRCs consist largely of prac-
ticing physicians appointed on a vol-
untary basis to assist DMQ in its 
enforcement and adjudicative functions. 
The MQRCs serve as a liaison with 
medical and community groups, perform 
non-disciplinary reviews, and may func-
tion as hearing panels for formal dis-
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ciplinary cases. They range in size from 
ten to forty members and consist of 
physicians, allied health professionals, 
and public members. A majority of the 
Committee members are practicing physi-
cians, nominated by DMQ, medical socie-
ties, and medical school deans. Public 
members and allied health members are 
directly appointed by the Governor. 
Each term of office is four years. 
8. Referral to Office of Attorney 
General for Accusation. The Office of 
the Attorney General receives the investi-
gative reports of the BMQA investigators 
and decides whether to prepare formal 
disciplinary charges ("accusations'') for 
signature by BMQA's Executive Director 
and filing. For allegations involving 
single acts of incompetence or gross 
negligence, or any case involving quality 
of care, such an accusation requires the 
Attorney General to obtain the concur-
rence of two outside medical experts 
that the investigation indicates incompe-
tence. Incompetence may not be simple 
negligence, but must be a pattern of 
negligent acts or gross incompetence and 
must be proved by "clear and convinc-
ing" evidence. Hence, the standard for 
prosecution under the Medical Practice 
Act is substantially more than is re-
quired to justify tort damages for negli-
gence in a civil case against a physician 
or other health professional. 
9. Administrative Hearing. The At-
torney General and BMQA determine 
whether to file an accusation, which 
seeks the formal discipline of a physician 
or other health professional pursuant to 
the adjudicative sections of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (APA) (Govern-
ment Code sections 11500 to 11528). 
The Attorney General must show with 
clear and convincing evidence to a reason-
ab le certainty that the physician or allied 
health professional has violated a statu-
tory duty warranting license revocation, 
suspension, or other discipline. Pursuant 
to the AP A, the physician may answer 
the accusation by formal pleading and 
commence discovery. 
Following discovery and preliminary 
motions, a hearing occurs. A number of 
alternative formats are available under 
the APA and DMQ practice for that 
hearing. The first alternative is to assign 
the matter to an administrative law judge 
(ALJ) from the Office of Administrative 
Hearings for hearing and tentative de-
cision. The second is to use the ALJ for 
evidentiary rulings at the hearing and to 
appoint five members of the local 
MQRC to sit as a panel and make the 
formal tentative decision. The third 
alternative is to use the ALJ for eviden-
3 
4 
tiary rulings at the hearing but to have 
DMQ sit as an adjudicative panel and 
make the decision directly. Where one 
of the first two alternatives is chosen 
(which is the normal course), the accused 
physician and the Attorney General both 
have available to them right of review 
by DMQ. 
Under Business and Professions Code 
section 2335(c), DMQ review is required 
where the proposed decision of the ALJ 
or MQRC would restrict or limit the 
extent, scope, or type of practice for a 
period exceeding one year; suspend the 
license for more than thirty days; or 
revoke the license. 
10. DMQ Review Hearing. DMQ 
receives the hearing transcript and recom-
mended decision. Where DMQ declines 
to adopt the decision upon review of the 
proceedings below, it may hold its own 
hearing. Written and oral argument at 
that hearing is permissive at the option 
of the respondent and the Attorney 
General. 
In the case of allied health profes-
sionals, the adjudicative process does 
not occur through DMQ but, after the 
filing of an accusation, is then subject to 
ALJ proceedings either alone or in con-
junction with panels of the respective 
allied health examining committees, sub-
ject to review by the appropriate allied 
health committee within DAHP. Like 
the physicians who control the majority 
of votes in DMQ, the respective allied 
health professionals subject to discipline 
control those committees engaging in 
the review. Where DMQ (or the allied 
health committee) makes a decision recom-
mending no discipline, that decision is 
effectively final. Although a substantial 
procedural error by DMQ may theoretic-
ally give rise to a basis for court review 
initiated by the Office of the Attorney 
General, such a review is rarely sought 
and would be subject to overwhelming 
difficulties in reversing a substantive 
decision of no discipline. 
11. Superior Court Review by Writ 
of Mandate. Where the final decision of 
DMQ is to impose discipline-even 
where that discipline is a suspension 
conditioned on retesting or other pro-
bationary requirements, the accused 
physician has an absolute right to re-
view by writ of mandate in superior 
court. The accused physician or allied 
health professional has a substantial 
number of permissible venues in which 
to petition for judicial review of the 
administrative procedure which led to a 
final decision of discipline. Filing a 
petition for writ of mandate delays the 
imposition of any actual penalty, includ-
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ing probationary conditions imposed on 
a suspended revocation or suspension, 
until the conclusion of court review. 
The superior court is required by law to 
exercise its "independent judgment", 
rather than applying the "substantial 
evidence" test. Under the latter test, the 
court determines whether the findings 
are supported by substantial evidence in 
light of the entire record. In recognition 
of the potential taking from the physician 
of a "vested right" (the right of contin-
ued use of the license to practice), the 
superior court reviews the evidence de 
novo. That is, the court does not review 
the decision of the ALJ or Division for 
error, but reviews the entire factual 
record and exercises his/her own inde-
pendent judgment as to the appropriate-
ness of the finding that the Medical 
Practice Act was violated (thus warrant-
ing discipline), and that the discipline 
imposed was appropriate to that offense. 
12. Court of Appeal Review. Where 
the accused physician or health profes-
sional is denied the requested writ of 
mandate, he/she has a right of appeal to 
the court of appeal in which that superior 
court sits. Appellate review involves the 
transmittal and certification of the ad- · 
ministrative record from the superior 
court to the court of appeal, the filing of 
written briefs, the scheduling of oral 
argument, and submission for final de-
cision. Court of appeal review normally 
takes several years to complete. 
13. Petition to the Supreme Court. 
Whatever the decision of the superior 
court or the court of appeal, both the 
Attorney General (on behalf of DMQ) 
and the accused physician or allied 
health professional have a right to pe-
tition the Supreme Court for review. 
This review by the Supreme Court is 
discretionary and may or may not be 
granted. Where it is granted, a two- to 
three-year period can be expected be-
tween the granting of the petition and 
the final published decision of the 
Supreme Court. In some cases, an ac-
cused physician may also seek further 
review to the U.S. Supreme Court where 
he/ she alleges a federal constitutional 
question exists under the statute or 
terms of discipline imposed. 
III. STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE SYSTEM'S FLAWS 
The basic administrative structure 
described above, taken from DMQ docu-
ments illustrative and representative of 
the current model for discipline, outlines 
serious structural infirmities. We describe 
infra the problems we have encountered 
in the respective stages of the operation 
of that system. However, while the basic 
structure is still in mind, several general 
observations are appropriate. 
First, any one of nine separate indi-
viduals in the complaint flow process is 
able to recommend the closure or diver-
sion of a case from the discipline track. 
Thus it is not surprising that in fiscal 
year 1987-88, of 4,685 complaints re-
ceived against physicians, only 109 
reached accusation filing for formal 
discipline (see Table I). Thirty of these 
109 were dismissed or withdrawn. Until 
the accusation is filed, the entire pro-
cedure described in steps 1-8 above is 
not subject to public disclosure. During 
fiscal year 1987-88, final discipline out-
put included revocation of 27 physician 
licenses, the voluntary surrender of 11, 
suspension of 15, and probation without 
any actual suspension or revocation for 
37 (see Table I). Out of 70,000 practicing 
licensees in California, only 42 were 
sanctioned by revocation or suspension 
of their license.3 
The final discipline result of 42 cases 
trivializes any concept of deterrence. 
Only 12 physicians received any disci-
pline (including straight probation) for 
incompetence in 1987-88, and 5 for self-
abuse of drugs or alcohol (see Table 2). 
This output is lower than the 58 revoca-
tions and suspensions during the 1986-
87 fiscal year, notwithstanding the in-
crease in complaints received from 4,361 
in 1986-87 to 4,685 in 1987-88. More 
recent data shows a further increase in 
complaints to a projected 6,000 per 
annum level and a further retraction in 
the number of revocations and suspen-
sions. This discipline output represents 
but a small fraction of the physicians 
who are convicted of serious felonies 
every year. During 1987-88, 715 physi-
cians and HMOs suffered malpractice 
judgments or settlements of over $30,000; 
249 had their hospital privileges denied 
or suspended by private action basecl on 
medical incompetence or impairment; 
and 7,000-10,000 are estimated by the 
AMA to be currently impaired by alco-
hol, drugs, or other infirmity.4 All of 
these numbers have increased markedly 
over the last five years, particularly over 
the past three years. 
The length of time that transpires 
during the administrative and judicial 
process ranges from six to eight years.5 
During this interim, in virtually every 
case, the physician maintains his/ her 
license in good standing and is free to 
practice medicine within the state of 
California. The number of temporary 
] 
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TABLE 1 
FOUR YEAR ACTION SUMMARY - ALL LICENSEES 
ACTIVITY 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 
MD* AH* ALL* MD AH ALL MD AH ALL MD AH ALL 
Complaints Received 4652 865 5517 4662 1205 5867 4361 1153 5514 4685 1275 5960 
Investigations 
Cases Opened' 2254 234 2488 2117 420 2537 2172 525 2697 1913 532 2445 
Cases Closed' 2297 361 2658 2229 468 2697 2485 407 2892 2170 491 2661 
Cases to Attorney General 173 0 173 185 0 185 202 0 202 181 79 217 
MD Cases to district attorneys 41 41 20 20 
Administrative Filings 
Statement of Issues to deny application 15 2 17 23 3 26 19 4 23 10 2 12 
Temporary restraining order 14 3 17 0 3 3 3 0 3 0 0 0 
Petition to compel psychiatric exam N/A N/A N/A 8 2 10 9 0 9 9 0 9 
Petition to compel competency exam N/A N/A N/A 8 N/A 8 8 N/A 8 11 N/A II 
Accusation/ petition to revoke probation 
Non-probation violation 121 16 137 110 26 136 96 32 128 109 56 165 
Probation violation 14 0 14 10 3 13 8 I 9 9 0 9 
Total Administrative Filings 164 21 188 159 37 196 143 37 180 148 58 206 
Administrative Actions 
Physicians called in for medical review 223 0 223 236 0 236 212 0 212 257 23 280 
Physicians referred to Diversion Program 37 N/A 37 33 N/A 33 29 N/A 29 28 N/A 28 
Subtotal reviews and referrals 260 0 260 269 0 269 241 0 241 285 23 308 
Decisions rendered: 
Revocation 17 3 20 22 6 28 40 II 51 27 II 38 
Voluntary surrender 25 0 25 22 0 22 17 3 20 II 3 14 
Suspension 15 5 20 13 8 21 18 0 18 15 10 25 
Probation 45 16 61 49 10 59 42 13 55 37 12 49 
Other I I 2 3 0 3 3 3 6 2 I 3 
Subtotal decisions adopted 103 25 128 109 24 133 120 30 150 92 37 129 
Total Administrative Actions 363 25 388 378 24 402 361 30 391 377 60 437 
Other Administrative Outcomes 
Statement of Issues to deny license 
Withdrawn 2 0 2 I 0 I 2 0 2 0 0 0 
Dismissed 12 0 12 I 0 I 2 0 2 0 0 0 
Upheld/application denied 19 2 21 4 4 8 9 I 10 II 2 13 
Denied/ application granted 7 0 7 I 0 I 0 I I 3 I 4 
Accusation withdrawn 4 0 4 II 0 II 14 I 15 18 I 19 
Accusation dismissed 10 I II II 0 II 2 0 2 12 0 12 
Judicial review completed 9 I 10 II I 12 4 I 5 3 0 3 
Total Other Administrative Outcomes 63 4 67 40 5 45 33 4 37 47 4 51 
'Approximately half of all complaints cannot proceed to investigation due to lack of information or jurisdiction 21ncludes cases from prior years 
•MD - Physician and Surgeon; AH - Allied Health Professions; ALL - Total of MD+ AH 
TABLE 2 
FOUR YEAR SUMMARY 
DECISIONS RENDERED BY VIOLATION TYPE- ALL LICENSEES 
84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 
TYPE OF VIOLATION 
MD AH ALL MD AH ALL MD AH ALL MD AH ALL 
Gross Negligence/ Incompetence 23 8 31 29 4 33 18 5 23 12 6 18 
Inappropriate Prescribing or Treatment 13 0 13 14 0 14 6 0 6 5 0 5 
Violation of Drug Laws 6 3 9 6 0 6 2 0 2 6 0 6 
Self Abuse of Drugs or Alcohol I 0 I 2 0 2 3 I 4 5 0 5 
Gross Immorality/Moral Turpitude 17 2 19 9 7 16 • • • • 
Dishonesty/ Fraud 5 5 10 7 2 9 
Mental Illness 9 0 9 2 I 3 4 I 5 5 0 5 
Aiding Unlicensed Practice 2 4 6 2 4 6 0 I I I I 2 
Unprofessional Conduct 12 6 18 9 7 16 • • • 
General Unprofessional Conduct 9 5 14 0 6 6 
Probation Violation 7 0 7 10 0 10 6 I 7 2 2 4 
Sexual Misconduct 7 6 13 8 6 14 
Conviction of a Crime 26 5 31 II 10 21 
Discipline by another State Board 15 0 15 17 0 17 
Other 12 2 14 26 27 19 0 19 13 4 17 
TOTAL DECISIONS RENDERED 102 25 127 109 24 133 120 30 150 92 37 129 
*These categories were replaced in 1986 by the categories which appear in bold face type below. 
The California Regulatory Law Reporter Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1989) 5 
6 
restraining orders or interim suspensions 
during 1987-88 was zero; there have been 
a total of three since 1985-86 (see Table 1). 
DMQ spent in excess of $8 million 
dollars in enforcement and related over-
head allocations to achieve this stat-
istical discipline result. As described 
below, the issues of trivial output, ex-
pense, and delay are not surprising, given 
the multi-layered structure of the disci-
pline system with decisions being made 
by the wrong people with inadequate 
information and in a fragmented fashion. 
The entire system is then further infected 
with a blatant solicitude for the profes-
sion both in its excessive orientation 
toward "rehabilitation", and by the 
active participation of interested competi-
tors, peers, and colleagues in the admin-
istrative process. The entire structure 
does not function as a device to excise 
the incompetent physician, but rather as 
a means to "help" physicians with prob-
lems which might impact patients serious-
ly. Hence, when DMQ President Dr. 
Eugene Ellis reminded us in a March 3, 
1989 public hearing that "society has a 
great investment in the education and 
training of physicians and the emphasis 
of the DMQ program must be therefore 
on rehabilitation," his attitude is not 
aberrational, but permeates the structure 
of the system from CSRs to the medical 
consultants to MQRCs and investigators. 
Because no prosecutor charged with pro-
tection of the public in the enforcement 
of these statutes enters the system until 
after a multiplicity of peer entities has 
determined that the investigative report 
should be presented for formal prosecu-
tion, the system operates only in extremis 
to discipline physicians. 
The in extremis nature of the "scop-
ing" of complaints to its trivial result in 
terms of output is apparent when one 
considers that the AMA itself recognizes 
that drug abuse, alcoholism, and other 
infirmities both mental and physical 
render l0-15% of practicing physicians 
unfit to practice medicine. Hence, Cali-
fornia has between 7,000-IO,000 licensed 
physicians who are unfit to practice 
under AMA standards. Approximately 
200 are now participating in BMQA's 
drug diversion program, which grants 
total immunity from discipline while the 
physician is in compliance with the 
terms of the program. The incidence of 
malpractice and physician negligence is 
serious and is reflected in malpractice 
judgments upheld on appeal, which have 
contributed to insurance premiums now 
in the $20,000-$80,000 per year range, 
depending on area and specialty. 
An output of 42 license revocations 
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or suspensions out of 70,000 practicing 
physicians, with 7,000- l0,000 suffering 
from alcohol, drug, or other impairment, 
and 200 in the diversion program (ap-
proximately one-third of whom will not 
successfully complete that program), and 
malpractice premiums and judgments at 
current levels suggest a system in serious 
crisis. It is particularly telling that al-
though the number of licensees has 
grown, drug abuse has increased over 
the decade, and malpractice premiums 
and negligence judgments have prolifer-
ated, the output of the system has actual-
ly declined. The current rate of license 
revocations is at 27 per annum. 
IV. THE ACTUAL DISCIPLINE 
OF CALIFORNIA'S PHYSICIANS 
A. Outreach/Detection 
The first step in a discipline system 
is the detection of behavior which vio-
lates statutory standards. As noted 
above, approximately 55% of DMQ's 
open investigations originate from con-
sumer complaints. Although this source 
of information is inadequate for total 
reliance, it is a major source of infor-
mation about likely incompetence, drug 
abuse, and dishonesty. It is therefore 
appropriate for consumers to be within 
easy reach of DMQ to convey relevant 
information about the performance of 
BMQA licensees. 
During 1988, the Assembly Office of 
Research performed an investigation and 
issued a report about the outreach (and 
related) performance of DMQ at the 
request of Assemblymember Jackie 
Speier. The report was released in July 
1988 under the blunt title "No Such 
Listing-Consumer Access to the Board 
of Medical Quality Assurance. "6 The 
report noted that as of June 1988, 
BMQA's number appeared in only 33 of 
172 surveyed California telephone direct-
ories. The cost of being listed in the state 
agency section of the Pacific Bell direct-
ory is $1.00. BMQA does not advertise 
in any telephone book's yellow pages. 
The survey also concluded: "(telephone 
41 I] information operators are often 
unable to help confused callers." Opera-
tors are trained only to check phone 
numbers covered by that area's phone 
directory; hence, if BMQA is not listed, 
a call to 411 directory assistance will not 
produce a means for consumer access to 
this agency. The response is simply "no 
such listing exists." Even when consum-
ers are able to obtain a BMQA regional 
office number, the number of CSRs to 
answer complaint calls is generally in-
sufficient. The report listed three meas-
ures BMQA had taken to facilitate 
outreach, but described outreach by this 
critical agency as generally minimal. As 
discussed below, in examining DMQ's 
current backlog of investigations, such a 
lack of priority concerning outreach is 
perhaps understandable. Nevertheless, it 
is not indicative of a minimally accept-
able operating system. 
As described above, DMQ intake is 
decentralized in its regional offices in 
Sacramento, San Mateo, Fresno, Wood-
land Hills, Torrance, Santa Ana, and 
San Bernardino (as well as storefront 
district offices in San Diego and Red-
ding). Hence, CSRs located in one office 
may have sufficient time to handle calls 
while CSRs in others may not. It is 
unclear why there is not a centralized 
complaint receipt number and facility. 
CSRs do not conduct on-the-scene de-
tailed investigations, nor are they quali-
fied to do so. They need not be in the 
field. Further, even for consumers in the 
counties where telephone numbers are 
available through directories, these are 
often toll calls. DMQ should replicate 
the complaint receipt reforms of the 
State Bar and immediately create a state-
wide 800 toll-free number listed in every 
telephone directory in the state (under 
the white pages "State Government" sec-
tion), with 800 and 411 directory assist-
ance, and included in major yellow page 
phone directories under "Physicians -
Complaints." As described below, CSRs 
should be trained and supervised by 
experts in the prosecution of medical 
incompetence and dishonesty; that is, by 
a professional prosecutor familiar with 
legal standards and with the metho-
dology required to put together a case 
for administrative and judicial review. 
The CSRs are currently subject to no 
supervision by any person specifically 
trained in law in what is essentially a 
legal process. 
Medical experts in a wide variety 
of subject areas should be available to 
CSR supervisors in order to gauge the 
facial merit of incoming calls by quick 
reference. This reference expert panel 
should not consist of a single medical 
consultant, because any such consultant 
may well be trained in a particular area 
of medicine but may have very little 
knowledge about minimally acceptable 
standards of professional care in the 
many different specialties in which DMQ 
licensees practice. 
As one alternative to total reliance 
on consumer complaints, DMQ must 
monitor the various section 800 reports 
described above. At present, it monitors 
I 
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criminal convictions; malpractice actions 
which are settled or adjudicated in 
amounts above $30,000; reports of ex-
cessive prescribing (725 reports); reports 
from other physicians; and, to a limited 
extent, self-reporting through its diver-
sion program. Finally, as noted above, 
BMQA receives certain information-
usually in the area of drug abuse-from 
other agencies such as federal DEA and 
the state Board of Pharmacy. Each of 
these areas of information-gathering has 
serious impediments to its utility. 
The tracking of criminal cases post-
conviction and referral for possible disci-
pline is not timely. Final conviction fol-
lowing appeal often occurs three to four 
years after the criminal acts occurred. 
Under the current scheme, physicians 
are able to continue practicing during 
this long interim and often face disciplin-
ary charges not only after they have 
been convicted, but after they have 
served their sentences. DMQ is then in 
the difficult position of attempting to 
punish someone for a transgression that 
occurred many years ago and for which 
that person may have "paid his/ her debt 
to society" through incarceration or 
stringent terms of probation imposed by 
a court. 
In fact, many criminal cases warrant 
immediate action by DMQ to suspend 
the license of those who are accused 
prior to conviction. The standard for 
conviction of a criminal offense is proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt; the standard 
for the revocation of a license is clear 
and convincing evidence to a reasonable 
certainty. The two standards are sub-
stantially different. Further, the societal 
interest in deterrence and retribution in 
punishing a criminal may be Jess urgent 
than the need to remove that person 
from a position of trust as a physician 
in the community. Information about 
the potential criminal conduct of phy-
sician licensees should be available at 
point of arrest by automatic tie-in of 
DMQ to the Arrest Notification System 
(ANS) of the Attorney General's Office. 
Where licensees are fingerprinted, this 
system allows the automatic notification 
of a regulatory agency whenever its 
licensees are arrested at the time of the 
arrest. The State Bar has agreed to sub-
mit fingerprints of new licensees to the 
ANS so this automatic notification may 
take place at the most appropriate point 
in time-at the initial discovery of the 
possible criminal act. DMQ should do 
likewise with new medical licensees. 
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B. Section 801-03 Reports 
(Malpractice Actions) 
Section 801, 802, and 803 reports 
concerning malpractice actions are made 
to DMQ only if there is a settlement or 
judgment in excess of $30,000. There 
are two problems with this reporting 
mechanism. First, a $30,000 stipulation 
or judgment figure may or may not 
relate to the appropriateness of report-
ing the matter to DMQ for its separate 
purposes. Damages in a malpractice ac-
tion may be limited for a variety of 
reasons. A physician defendant will be 
aware of the BMQA notice threshold of 
$30,000 and may take $25,000 from the 
insurance company and make a side 
arrangement for additional funds per-
sonally. Alternatively, medical malprac-
tice cases often involve multiple defend-
ants; the physician can avoid reporting 
by keeping his/her own settlement below 
$30,000, while the plaintiff recovers from 
other defendants. 
Even in a litigated case, the degree 
of negligence of the physician and its 
likelihood of recurrence are not factors 
which directly relate to passing the 
$30,000 threshold amount for reporting. 
A physician may commit a series of 
egregious wrongs, but the patient in-
volved may not suffer severe damages 
beyond additional medical treatment 
costs. However, the competence level 
revealed may bode ill for future patients, 
which should be the focus of DMQ 
concern. 
On the other hand, the fact of a 
malpractice filing is important informa-
tion for DMQ. The law provides sub-
stantial protections to doctors from 
malpractice cases. Under the MICRA 
statute,7 medical malpractice actions are 
severely limited. Damages are substan-
tially restricted, and attorney contin-
gency fees are limited, thus lessening the 
likelihood of spurious claims. Hence, 
where cases are filed, they are worth 
looking at. 
BMQA learns about these cases only 
at their conclusion, replicating the prob-
lem with criminal convictions discussed 
above. These allegations, given the 
MICRA statute, are appropriate for 
immediate DMQ evaluation and track-
ing. As with the preliminary hearing in 
a criminal context, civil filings are usual-
ly made under oath and often include 
early discovery "on the record." On-
the-record documents include pleadings 
and transcripts of depositions of wit-
nesses under oath. At the very least, a 
review of this evidence as available will 
enable BMQA to evaluate the case for 
The California Regulatory Law Reporter Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1989) 
its own purposes. 
DMQ should evaluate all malpractice 
actions from the filing of a claim or suit 
and track them in all official documents 
filed as to any licensee under its juris-
diction thence forward. Where evidence 
adduced indicates the likelihood of an 
incompetent practitioner, DMQ should 
proactively intervene contemporaneously 
with the civil action (not after its con-
clusion) to protect the public through 
interim relief or independent license 
revocation action. 
C. Coroner Reports 
Coroners are another major source 
of information about serious physician 
incompetence. Coroners evaluate causes 
of death as a professional specialty. They 
are in a position to perform autopsies, 
detect medical failure, and assess physi-
cian performance. At present, coroners 
are theoretically able to report possible 
negligence by physicians-but rarely do 
so. Coroners are part of the medical 
profession and work with practicing 
physicians. This regular working relation-
ship creates an occupational interface 
which makes the reporting of physician 
incompetence extremely difficult. Cor-
oners who report errors or incompetence 
may face pressure or accusations of bias. 
They are also subject to charges of "turn-
ing in a colleague" with the possible 
consequence of depriving that colleague 
of his/ her livelihood. 
The California Coroners' Association 
has candidly admitted that its members 
do not routinely report physician error 
or incompetence because of the current 
voluntary nature of the system. The 
Association has requested a mandatory 
requirement to report in order to, in 
effect, "take its members off the hook." 
By removing the discretion, the outside 
pressures not to report are eliminated. 
Further, the Coroners' Association be-
lieves that reports indicating negligence 
should be filed without requiring the 
coroner to make any findings regarding 
"gross negligence" appropriate for dis-
cipline. Just as the coroners do not want 
discretion on whether to report, they also 
do not want discretion on what to report. 
These changes in the reporting re-
quirement were endorsed in principle by 
the MQRCs and DMQ in December 
1988. Draft legislation has been formu-
lated to require coroners or deputy cor-
oners who receive information indicating 
that a death may be the result of physi-
cian negligence or incompetence to file 
a confidential report with BMQA. The 
draft also immunizes coroners from 
7 
8 
damages in civil actions as a result of 
the filing of such a report. This legisla-
tion is important in stimulating one of 
the most important sources of informa-
tion available to DMQ about physician 
incompetence and deserves enactment. 
D. Section 805 Reports 
Until 1988, whenever a licensed physi-
cian was "denied staff privileges, re-
moved from medical staff of the institu-
tion, or if his or her staff or membership 
privileges [were] restricted for a cumula-
tive total of 45 days in any calendar 
year for any medical disciplinary cause 
or reason," a "section 805" report must 
be filed with BMQA. A report includes 
a statement detailing the nature of the 
so-called "peer review" action and the 
reasons for it. The law also required 
that a report be made if the removal or 
restriction was "by resignation or other 
voluntary action that was requested or 
bargained for in lieu of medical disciplin-
ary action." 
This mechanism for reporting physi-
cian incompetence, drug abuse, or dis-
honesty is theoretically among the most 
important sources of information about 
physician performance extant. Those 
with whom a physician works know 
more about his/her economic arrange-
ments, sobriety, and medical competence 
than do patients. They are in a position 
to survey his/her work in relation to 
that of others in the community. 
Unfortunately, most of the protec-
tion from physician incompetence de-
rives not from the state agency assigned 
this basic purpose, but from the private 
decisionmaking of medical clinics, hos-
pitals, and other institutions through 
peer review proceedings. Physicians must 
have access to these facilities in order to 
practice, and to the extent that these 
facilities deny that access, they affect 
who the practitioners are.8 For the same 
reasons that coroners are hesitant to 
report occasions of negligence, so are 
colleagues of impaired or incompetent 
physicians. A detection mechanism that 
depends upon such "turning in" may 
receive as many reports based on person-
al animosity and "hospital politics" as 
on medical performance. 
When reviewing the basis for denial 
or suspension of staff privileges, DMQ 
seeks to compel information about a 
physician's performance which would 
otherwise be unavailable. In so doing, 
DMQ must recognize the inappropriate-
ness of total reliance on these private 
decisionmaking structures. Many do not 
afford the physicians involved traditional 
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due process and most have historically 
raised serious antitrust questions. The 
extent to which a group of competitors 
controlling a medical facility is able to 
effectively boycott a competitor by ex-
cluding him/her from an institution may 
indicate incentives other than the object-
ive evaluation of medical performance. 
In an industry as lucrative as medical 
practice, such ancillary incentives are 
not insignificant. 
The section 805 law described above 
was altered effective January I, 1988, 
making a number of changes. These 
changes were to some extent spawned 
by the Federal Health Care Quality 
Improvement Act of 1986, an attempt 
to improve the amount of data concern-
ing peer review actions and to encourage 
those activities by extending immunity 
to those making reports through state 
and federal law. Two years ago, legisla-
tion (SB 1620 and AB 2249) was enacted 
by the California legislature, effective 
January I, 1988. These bills require more 
peer review entities to report; expand 
somewhat the definition of "staff privi-
leges"; and require reporting of staff 
privileges suspension for 30 days rather 
than 45 days, the furnishing of a copy of 
the section 805 report to the person who 
is its subject (with notice of his/her 
right to submit exculpatory information 
to the agency), and supplemental reports 
where the licensee is deemed to have 
satisfied any terms or conditions imposed 
as a precondition to renewed staff privi-
leges. As with the previous law, section 
805 reports about a physician are sub-
mitted to other hospitals to whom that 
physician may apply for privileges. 
There are numerous problems with 
this statute, even as amended. First of 
all, the statute defines the term "denial 
or termination of privileges" to mean 
"failure or refusal to renew a contract or 
renew, extend, or re-establish any staff 
privileges, when the action is based on 
medical disciplinary cause or reason." A 
primary problem in receiving adequate 
information, even where an institution 
decides to deny, suspend, or revoke hos-
pital privileges for a licensee, is the 
tendency to let the licensee know there 
is a problem and to allow him/ her to 
voluntarily resign prior to proceeding. 
The other institutions where that physi-
cian may have privileges never learn of 
the problem and BMQA never investi-
gates his/her performance. This "with-
draw your application or resign now" 
( or "take a vacation") option is under-
standably tempting for any medical insti-
tution. The alternative is going to be, 
under the law as it is evolving, a full-
blown due process hearing. Further, 
there is the danger of countersuit. 
On the other hand, the institution 
may be concerned, in good faith, about 
its reputation and its other practitioners 
should this marginal or incompetent 
practitioner be allowed to continue. The 
easy way out is the withdrawal or resig-
nation option, which does not trigger a 
section 805 report. In order to meet this 
problem, the amendments of section 805 
purport to require the reporting of resig-
nations as well. Section 805(d) states: 
"in addition to the duty to report set 
forth [above] the peer review body also 
has the duty to report under this section 
a licentiate's resignation from member-
ship, staff, or employment following 
notice of an impending investigation 
based on information indicating medical 
disciplinary cause or reason." 
This resignation reporting has a num-
ber of problems. First, it does not apply 
in cases where an initial application for 
privileges is made but has not yet been 
reviewed, and is then withdrawn (per-
haps upon informal indication that it 
would not be accepted). More import-
ant, what does "notice of an impending 
investigation" mean? In fact, those with 
existing hospital privileges, to whom the 
resignation reporting requirement may 
apply, are well aware in the normal 
course of the prospect of an "impending 
investigation." It is unclear when the 
"impending investigation" is initiated, 
and when a withdrawal occurs before it 
is initiated, thereby excusing a section 
805 report. Second, it is also unclear 
what is a "medical disciplinary cause or 
reason" in practice. If the reason is 
otherwise, no report is required. 
The most important legislative change 
which might address at least the subsid-
iary problem is the granting of clear 
immunity to those who do report the 
incompetence of other physicians. Sec-
tion 805(d) provides that "no person 
shall incur any civil liabilities as a result 
of making the report required by this 
section." However, the information pro-
vided leading to the report, and informa-
tion directly from physicians to DMQ 
about other physicians, is subject to a 
limited immunity provision allowing suit 
where the matter is not "reasonably be-
lieved to be true. "9 While it may appear 
appropriate to allow a cause of action 
against someone who "unreasonably be-
lieves" reports of drug abuse, dishonesty, 
or incompetence, such a limited immuni-
ty operates as virtually no immunity at 
all. In fact, the reported physician need 
simply allege a lack of reasonable basis 
to file suit. The potential exposure of 
j 
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having to defend such a case seriously 
impedes reports of drug abuse and in-
competence. 
Reports made directly to DMQ should 
be absolutely privileged without limita-
tion or condition. These reports are kept 
confidential by the agency and are the 
basis for "leads" for its own independent 
investigation. Where a licensee continu-
ously provides false leads, the agency 
may begin to disregard that information. 
However, the information is not pro-
vided to the general public to slander 
the reputation of the physician involved, 
but is provided to a state agency with 
the responsibility to evaluate the so-
briety, competence, and honesty of phy-
sicians. That report should be made with 
full confidence that there will be no 
retribution, including the filing of a lawsuit. 
Table 3 presents the historical and 
recent data of information disclosures 
through section 800 reports to DMQ. In 
relation to the number of physicians 
known to be drug-impaired, the number 
of reports is minimal. The reports com-
ing from physicians about the incompe-
tence of their colleagues is an extremely 
minor source of information given the 
current constraints on such reporting as 
noted above. 
Failure to submit a section 805 report 
gives rise to a misdemeanor criminal 
offense. However, as noted above, staff 
privilege withdrawal before the impend-
ing investigation "begins" and the 
ambiguity about the cause being a 
"medically disciplinable basis" stimulates 
evasion. There has yet to be a misdemean-
or criminal prosecution for failure to 
file a section 805 report in the history of 
the statute. It is critical for DMQ to 
gather egregious examples of failure to 
so report, and to prosecute those cases 
as criminal misdemeanors in order to 
send a signal to the medical institutions 
about their clear obligations under the 
law. In addition, a more useful and 
mechanical approach would be to amend 
the statute itself to require the reporting 
of all withdrawals, denials, suspensions, 
or restrictions of medical privileges from 
any institution for any reason as a 
routine matter. Submitted with that 
report should be any documentary or 
explanatory information available to the 
institution concerning the standard of 
care, performance, honesty, or sobriety 
under current standards which may apply 
to that licensee. Hence, complaints re-
ceived by the hospital from the staff, 
other physicians, and patients must be 
transmitted to DMQ where there is any 
action regarding privileges, however that 
action is characterized by the institution. 
TABLE 3 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND HEALTH FACILITY 
REPORTS RECEIVED BY LICENSE TYPE, 
SOURCE, AND CAUSE FOR DISCIPLINE 
FOUR YEAR SUMMARY 
Medical Malpractice 
8 & P Code Section 801: Insurers 
Physician and Surgeon 
Health Maintenance Organization 
Podiatrist 
Subtotal 
Section 802: Attorneys or Self-Report 
Physician and Surgeon 
Health Maintenance Organization 
Subtotal 
Section 803: Courts 
Physician and Surgeon 
Health Maintenance Organization 
Subtotal 
Total Malpractice 
Health Facility Disciplinary Actions 
Section 805: Incomplete Medical Records 




Section 805.5: Medical Cause or Reason 




Total Health Facilities 
It is not appropriate to delegate to a 
private entity, or to an economic com-
petitor in the medical marketplace, the 
decision regarding what constitutes a 
disciplinable offense. Information should 
be supplied to DMQ which would make 
that evaluation, and that information 
should be completely and automatically 
submitted as a matter of normal course. 10 
E. Self-Reporting/Diversion 
In addition to the sources of infor-
mation described above, physicians are 
in a position to "self-report" under 
DMQ's Diversion Program. This pro-
gram allows physicians who are chemical-
ly dependent or suffering from psycho-
logical ailments to enter a rehabilitation 
program and, in turn, receive immunity 
from discipline. This program, as pres-
ently constituted, is one of the most 
generous and solicitous programs of its 
84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 
322 417 469 455 
II 20 0 8 
7 12 13 9 
340 449 482 472 
13 15 41 93 
87 144 117 133 
100 159 158 226 
14 20 12 17 
3 0 0 0 
17 20 12 17 
457 628 652 715 
451 712 1,034 1,108 
4 3 13 I 
0 I 2 I 
455 716 1,049 l,I IO 
171 145 169 249 
2 3 3 2 
I 0 0 I 
174 148 172 252 
629 865 1,221 1,362 
kind in the nation. Rather than proceed 
with discipline and allow an agreement 
to seek medical treatment to mitigate 
the discipline to be imposed, BMQA 
opts for a maximum carrot and minimal 
stick by granting absolute immunity so 
long as the program is entered and com-
pleted. Further, if the referral into the 
Diversion Program does not originate 
with the discipline system (from DMQ), 
failure to complete the program will not 
result in discipline or discipline review. 
Hence, a self-surrender where discipline 
is likely to be imminent will achieve 
immunity for a licensee which, as a prac-
tical matter, precludes discipline even if 
the treatment program is rejected and 
abandoned contrary to the written agree-
ment entered into by the licensee with 
the program. 
We are reserving an analysis of the 
Diversion Program for a future report. 
However, there are approximately 200 
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persons in the Diversion Program. Ap-
proximately one-third of those entering 
the program have failed to successfully 
complete it. These statistics do not com-
pare favorably with the magnitude of 
the problem. The AMA estimates that 
10-15% of physicians are seriously im-
paired by drugs, alcohol, or other mental 
impairment. 11 This means there are 7,000-
10,000 impaired California physicians. 
Although such self-reporting has ad-
vantages and should certainly be attempt-
ed, it is unreliable as a source of infor-
mation about physician performance and 
rehabilitative needs. 
F. Detecting Patterns 
In addition to telephone calls at point 
of intake, all of the information de-
scribed above should be included in a 
case investigation tracking system 
(CITS). DMQ has such a system, but it 
does not include the information de-
scribed above. It does not include the 
50,000-80,000 initial contacts from con-
sumers, many of which may involve in-
formation relevant to physician perform-
ance-not that each alone constitutes 
evidence of a disciplinable offense, but 
insofar as these reports contain infor-
mation which may, in combination with 
other reports and information, reveal a 
pattern appropriate for further investi-
gation or other intervention. 
As noted above, CITS does not in-
clude information about criminal matters 
in a timely fashion (at point of arrest), 
or about malpractice actions at point of 
filing or in all relevant cases. As to the 
latter, even those matters which are re-
ported are usually "closed without merit" 
where the settlement or judgment is for 
damages below $ I 00,000. As does the 
statute, DMQ incorrectly assumes that 
there is a direct relationship among 
the monetary award to a patient, the 
severity of the conduct, and the ap-
propriateness of a disciplinary investi-
gation. The concepts are, in fact, dis-
tinct. As a result, cases appropriate for 
computer entry for detection of marginal 
but repeated acts, and which in cumula-
tive impact warrant intervention, are 
lost. Separate reports of a physician 
who has suffered a DUI arrest, a letter 
from a patient complaining about so-
briety, a phone call from another patient 
about missed appointments, and a mal-
practice complaint which may allege 
facts indicating a lack of sobriety are 




AGING OF CASES CURRENTLY UNDER INVESTIGATION 
0 · 30 days 
31 - 90 days 
91 - 180 days 
181 - 365 days 
366+ - days 
Totals 
G. Proactive Investigations 
DMQ conducts proactive investiga-
tions primarily involving violations of 
section 725 of the Business and Profes-
sions Code (excessive prescribing). 
Where there are "repeated acts of clearly 
excessive prescribing, "12 they may be 
investigated by undercover operations, 
pharmacy audits, obtaining patient com-
plaint records, or other means. For 
purposes of enforcing the Medical Prac-
tice Act, DMQ investigators are con-
sidered "peace officers" and may engage 
in undercover activities. One impediment 
to this enforcement is the fact that sec-
tion 632(a) of the Penal Code prohibits 
one-party consensual taping of communi-
cations without the permission of the 
district attorney or attorney general. 
Sheriff's deputies, city police depart-
ments, and the AG's office are exempt 
from this requirement. BMQA is now 
seeking statutory authority to engage 
in one-party consensual taping exempt 
from the Penal Code section 632. That 
request should be granted. 
BMQA investigators, operating as 
peace officers, may serve not only sub-
poenas but search warrants. The statute 
concerning medical privacy should be 
amended to allow unlimited access to 
medical records by DMQ investigators, 
subject to confidentiality within DMQ 
and appropriate protective orders in 
public discipline proceedings, to allow 
unlimited search of patient records for 
discipline purposes. Such an intrusion 
into a patient's privacy occurs for the 
benefit of all patients and does not ex-
cessively compromise privacy rights 
where the information is held confiden-
tial within the agency and subject to 
protective order confidentiality in later 
proceedings and court review. 
Proactive investigation by DMQ is 
particularly appropriate in cases of sus-
pected drug abuse where dysfunction 
can be fatal to patients. Hence, proced-
ures should be established for the affirm-
ative and required drug testing of speci-













fled medical professionals whose mental 
alertness and sobriety are essential to 
patient survival. This would include anes-
thesiologists, surgeons, and others whose 
physical fine motor skills cannot be im-
paired at the risk of irreparable harm. 
That system should allow proactive drug/ 
alcohol testing upon a showing of "reason-
able suspicion n that there is a drug/ alcohol 
impairment problem as to that person. 
H. Backlog 
A condition precedent to an effective 
discipline system is an office of investi-
gations able to follow up on the report-
ing and detection of possible abuse as 
described above. DMQ now has a back-
log of cases which preclude immediate 
attention to incoming cases. DMQ staff 
has counted a current backlog of 721 cases. 
However, this figure is not fully reflective 
of the problem because of the limited 
definition of "backlog" used by DMQ. 
DMQ includes in its backlog only those 
cases which warrant investigation but 
have not yet been assigned to investigators. 
The State Bar properly defines "back-
log" as any case which has been in its Off-
ice of Investigations longer than six 
months (with the exception of cases desig-
nated as "complex" by the Bar's Chief 
Trial Counsel). Interestingly, DMQ im-
poses a similar time limit for the inves-
tigation of Priority I cases. Although 
DMQ's count of 721 unassigned cases 
reveals part of the backlog, cases should 
also be defined as "backlogged" if they 
are in process longer than maximally 
acceptable time spans for investigation 
or processing. Otherwise, simply assign-
ing a case to someone eliminates a backlog. 
Defined in the generally accepted 
manner, the BMQA backlog exceeds 
1,500 cases. On March 22, 1989, in re-
sponse to our request, DMQ calculated 
the age of cases currently assigned to 
investigators (beyond the 721 cases back-
logged awaiting assignment). This data 
is presented in Table 4, which indicates 
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that 419 of the 978 physician cases and 
240 of the 426 allied health professional 
cases have been under investigation more 
than six months without resolution. 
Moreover, this backlog may be further 
increased if one counts cases delayed or 
improperly diverted at the CSR stage 
(now described by Chief of Enforcement 
Vern Leeper at 1,043 cases), and cases 
backlogged in the adjudication process. 
This latter backlog includes those cases 
delayed post-investigation and would 
properly include a substantial percentage 
of the 462 cases awaiting accusation 
drafting, hearing, or otherwise delayed. 
In total, it appears that the backlog 
condition of DMQ's discipline system is 
more serious than the backlog of the 
State Bar's discipline system at its worst 
levels.13 
The actual backlog of DMQ is much 
more serious than the reported 721 figure 
suggests because of its qualitative nature. 
Five hundred of them are Priority I 
cases involving potential patient harm. 
In analyzing BMQA's 1989-90 budget, 
the Legislative Analyst noted that the 
vast majority of cases in DMQ's backlog 
are those involving "potential harm" to 
patients. Almost 200 of these cases in-
volving Priority I potential harm to 
patients have been unassigned for more 
than six months. 
In order to deal with this emergency, 
the staff informed the members of Div-
ision of Medical Quality on February 
28, 1989 that it was altering the investi-
gation priorities and procedures describ-
ed in Section II above. The staff noted 
that in addition to the current 721 back-
logged assigned cases and additional 
cases that have been in process well over 
six months, and other cases backlogged 
in other parts of the system, the number 
of cases coming through intake has in-
creased substantially during I 988-89. 
The staff memorandum stated: "During 
the first half of fiscal year 1988-89 we 
received 3,065 complaints. Of the com-
plaints received, 1,507 were put into the 
formal investigation process. At this rate 
we will experience an increase of 17.2% 
in complaints and 18.5% in investiga-
tions over fiscal year 1987-88. Using 
these figures, we can assume a similar 
increase in the investigative backlog and 
the CSR complaint processing backlog. 
It is clear that absent additional staff 
we must make some hard decisions re-
garding what we investigate formally, 
informally and what we just can't in-
vestigate. "14 
The four priorities unveiled at DMQ's 
March 3, 1989 meeting categorize as 
Priority I those cases which demonstrate 
FEATURE ARTICLE 
actual or high potential for patient harm. 
The February 28 memo then confesses: 
"Due to the severity of these complaints 
a target date of 30 days for an assign-
ment to an investigator and 180 days 
for completion is reasonable. However, 
unless caseloads assigned to individ-
ual investigators are decreased, the 
completion dates will be difficult to 
accomplish." 
Priorities 2 and 3 are simply other 
cases which do not involve immediate 
potential irreparable harm to patients. 
"These cases would be handled, at least 
initially, by the Consumer Services 
Representative, Medical Consultant and 
Supervisor." In other words, these 
cases will be effectively removed from 
the discipline system and subject to a 
phone call remonstration or letter of 
warning. Fourth priority is given to 
complaints that do not involve patient 
care issues. These include "insurance 
fraud, absent indication that it is will-
ful or repetitive." (It is unclear how 
"insurance fraud" is ever not "willful".) 
Complaints which are multi-jurisdictional 
and where another agency may have 
jurisdiction will also be classified as 
Priority 4 cases. 
It will be nine months or more before 
most of the unassigned backlog will be 
reviewed. The current DMQ case carry-
over from year to year now equals in 
size (2,000) the total number of new 
investigations opened or closed during 
a full year. Put another way, BMQA 
started this year with a caseload that 
was 100% filled. If not a single new 
case appeared, more than a year would 
transpire before the decks would clear 
for the investigators. Additional time 
would be required for CSR and AG 
backlogs. 
The situation with regard to the 
DMQ discipline system covering doc-
tors is not a matter of administrative 
concern-it is an emergency. In the 
face of this emergency, as we discuss 
below, BMQA's 1989-90 budget-as 
approved by the Department of Con-
sumer Affairs and the Department 
of Finance-includes no additional 
resources or positions for enforce-
ment. The Legislative Analyst writes: 
"BMQA has 44 investigators and 3 
limited term assistant investiga-
tive positions to investigate complaints. 
For 1989-90, the budget proposes to 
maintain the same staffing level as 
in the current year. "15 When asked in 
December the direct question, "Will 
BMQA ever catch up on the unassigned 
case backlog?" Mr. Leeper simply an-
swered, "No." 
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I. Authority 
In order to properly respond to an 
overflow situation, address high-priority 
items effectively, or properly maximize 
limited resources, the DMQ discipline 
system needs adequate authority with 
which to function. This authority in-
cludes investigative authority as de-
scribed above, and the power to act 
effectively in the interests of the public. 
Such authority would provide for sum-
mary proceedings. It would allow for 
the automatic revocation of licenses 
upon certain preconditions. It would 
provide for interim license suspension 
where necessary for public health and 
safety. It would also allow the use of 
flexible remedies to protect the public 
upon a showing lesser than the clear 
and convincing requirement for total 
license revocation. 
We discuss below basic structural 
changes for all cases. Critical among 
these proposed amendments are pro-
visions to allow interim suspension 
of physicians. At present, interim sus-
pension is accomplished through a 
temporary restraining order (TRO) 
process in superior court which is ex-
tremely difficult to accomplish and 
rarely attempted. No such orders were 
obtained in fiscal year 1987-88, and only 
three have been secured since fiscal 
year 1985-86 (see Table I). Even in cases 
of egregious incompetence, BMQA is 
effectively powerless to act to protect 
the public. The same kind of interim 
relief now used by the Bar to suspend 
accused attorneys should be adopted for 
DMQ use. 
J. Administrative Process 
Exhibit I outlines the actual steps of 
the administrative process for discipline. 
That chart depicts the various levels and 
numerous exit points and accommoda-
tion opportunities extant. Actual disci-
pline must run this gauntlet. The system 
is fragmented at the outset with intake 
at seven regional or two district offices 
by one of numerous separately operating 
CSRs or consumer service technicians. 
BMQA receives from 50,000-80,000 
phone calls per year from consumers. 
Approximately 6,000 are designated 
"complaints". That culling is a critical 
function. One-half of these 6,000 com-
plain ts are then in turn filtered, 
mediated, or closed. 
The required qualifications for CS Rs 
include two years of experience in state 
service including contact with the gen-
eral public or three years in a profes-
11 
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sional trade or consumer organization 
handling consumer complaints. CSRs 
are not required to have any expertise 
or experience in law or medicine. They 
are supervised, again in fragmented 
fashion, by separate supervising investi-
gators. The primary motivation of super-
vising investigators is the management 
of the backlog of caseloads described 
above. In the manual BMQA supplies 
to its CS Rs, the front-line intake person-
nel who actually receive the information 
directly from the complaining public, 
BMQA tells the CSRs: "Patients are the 
chief source of complaints to the Board." 
The next sentence tells the CSRs, how-
ever, that "only a small proportion of 
patient complaints result in disciplinary 
actions against physicians." The manual 
nonetheless assures the CSRs that "the 
handling of patient complaints is one 
of the most important functions of the 
CSR (because] the proper handling of 
such complaints is critical to the public's 
confidence in the Board and the medical 
profession." The message is barely hid-
den: patients who complain rarely have 
anything of value, but listen so that they 
don't magnify their complaint or extend 
it to us. 
The primary orientation of medical 
consultants has been to "solve problems" 
as a mediator. In addition to evaluating 
complaints for their merit, the regional 
consultants generally view themselves as 
"Dutch uncles" to physicians who have 
problems. They take pride in meeting 
privately with the physician and in 
straightening out their problems. They 
have no expertise in the law and are 
not oriented toward or trained in law 
enforcement. Nor are they necessarily 
medical experts in the area of medicine 
addressed in the complaint. 
As Exhibit I makes clear, there are 
numerous exit points or opportunities 
for "private conferences" with physicians 
which result in the closure of matters 
prior to formal investigation. Less than 
50% of the matters designated as facial 
complaints by a CSR are transmitted 
for formal investigation. Less than 50% 
of the matters formally investigated 
result in the filing of formal accusations, 
and less than 2% result in recommended 
license revocation or suspension. "Scop-
ing" of complaints from intake to final 
disposition is to be expected, but not to 
this extreme degree. Whatever the fail-
ures of outreach or proactive detection, 
surely more than I% of the complaints 
determined by CSRs to be valid must 
warrant actual discipline. 
We discussed above the justification 
for a centralized intake system. That 
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unit should be directed onsite by a 
special deputy attorney general appoint-
ed for that purpose in consultation with 
DMQ. This designated DAG should 
supervise a defined group of deputies 
who prosecute these cases on behalf of 
the people of California. The CSRs 
should be trained in the legal require-
ments for proving a discipline case by 
someone trained in that subject. 
The special deputy attorney general 
assigned to intake should review every 
CSR-closed case to guarantee that it is 
properly closed under consistent legal 
standards, and that it is registered in 
the enhanced CITS system for pattern 
detection, as described above. The in-
take deputy attorney general would then 
refer cases out, as appropriate, to the 
regional medical consultant for "warn-
ing conferences" where the violations 
are marginal or are not likely to result 
in final discipline. The cases that the 
deputy attorney general believes are ap-
propriate for further investigation, 
based on the consistent application of 
the proper legal criteria and an evalua-
tion of the evidence which may be avail-
able and capable of achieving a disci-
pline result, will be turned over to the 
appropriate regional investigating super-
visor for further investigation, as is 
presently the case. However, at the same 
time, a prosecuting deputy attorney gen-
eral would be assigned to the case. That 
attorney general will supervise the in-
vestigative work, assist the investigator 
in identifying evidence which must be 
obtained in order to sustain any disci-
pline sought, approve closure, and seek 
interim suspension where appropriate. 
The regional medical consultant 
should review the progress of the in-
vestigation and comment on its technical 
features and medical aspects. The exist-
ing MQRCs should serve as expert ad-
visory panels to be used in the evalua-
tion of cases, as expert witnesses at 
hearings, and as probation monitors to 
those who have been adjudicated appro-
priate for discipline. The deputy attor-
ney general supervising the case can 
direct the gathering of evidence and, 
together with the regional medical con-
sultant, refer matters involving expertise 
to specific MQRC members or DMQ 
volunteers expert in that field of medi-
cine, and review their recommendations. 
There is a lack of even facial justifica-
tion for the use in a discipline process as 
adjudicators or final decisionmakers of 
persons because they have some medical 
expertise where: (a) the judgments they 
are rendering are legal judgments, not 
medical judgments; and (b) their exper-
tise is not in the area of medicine 
relevant to the case. Both serious defects 
are remedied where a person with spe-
cific legal expertise, responsibility, and 
knowledge of statewide standards of 
prosecution and appropriate remedies, 
can obtain precise medical advice from 
the experts who know about that par-
ticular field or a particular case. This 
revised structure would also facilitate 
the undercover operation of investi-
gators since they will be working under 
the direct supervision of the deputy 
attorney general. 
In addition to structural problems, 
DMQ's administrative process is suffer-
ing a serious work overload. Caseloads 
have increased from 35.6 in 1982 to 
43.4 in 1987. At present, if the isolated 
unassigned backlog were assigned, case 
levels would exceed 60 per investigator, 
double the prior staff estimates of op-
timum levels. Perhaps even more im-
portant has been an increase in cases 
monitoring those on probation. These 
cases have increased in number from 65 
in 1982, to 75 in 1987. We believe 
current levels approximate 80 per in-
vestigator. These cases concern those 
impaired or incompetent practitioners 
extreme enough to survive the vigorous 
culling described above. These physi-
cians are a demonstrable danger and 
cannot realistically be monitored at 
current caseloads. 
K. Legal Process: 
Hearing and Review 
Under the current system, following 
the multi-staged administrative review, 
the matter goes to hearing before a five-
member panel of the MQRC and/ or an 
ALJ from the Office of Administrative 
Hearings. The matter is then subject to 
review by and oral argument before 
DMQ itself. 
This administrative process has some 
severe drawbacks. First, neither the 
MQRC nor the DMQ should participate 
in adjudicatory decisionmaking. The 
MQRC members should assist in detect-
ing violations, preventive educational 
projects, provision of expert testimony, 
and probation monitoring, as noted 
above. The Division of Medical Quality, 
an important body, should not become 
involved in oral argument consideration 
during its meetings once every three 
months as an adjudicative body. It is 
there to perform the more important 
quasi-legislative function of adopting 
rules and setting standards for the pro-
fession. Those rules guide the discipline 
system in its general parameters. It 
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should make judgments about alloca-
tion of resources. It should perform the 
functions most appropriate for a body 
with its expertise and workload. 
Second, because the factual deter-
minations, findings, and recommended 
discipline are not being decided by a 
court, and because a physician has a 
constitutional right to "court review", 
the end result will usually be judicial 
review of the entire proceeding under 
the "independent judgment" test. This 
phenomenon tends to lessen the value 
and utility of what went on before. That 
is, the "trier of fact" in an adminis-
trative proceeding (either the ALJ or 
an MQRC panel with an ALJ making 
evidentiary rulings) is the judge who 
sees and hears the witnesses, and who 
makes the very important factual find-
ings. It is a sensible presumption of 
American law that it is important to 
see the witnesses and evidence directly. 
Evaluating credibility of witness testi-
mony requires physical presence. Courts 
accord a great deal of deference to the 
factual findings of the person who di-
rectly sees the witnesses and their cross-
examination, considering not only what 
they say, but how they say it. In any 
discipline case, these judgments are 
of great import. However, the hearing 
where this decision is initially made is 
not held before a "court". Hence, a 
reviewing court, who does not see the 
evidence, must exercise its own independ-
ent judgment as to what the facts show, 
but has only the transcript from which 
to work. The more removed one is from 
actual testimony, the more one may be 
swayed by the vagaries of the adversarial 
process and by skilled counsel. 
To the extent possible, decisions 
should be made by people with the most 
information and who have maximum 
knowledge and independence. Such is 
not the case in the current context. 
Rather, panels from one of fourteen 
different MQRCs are likely to make the 
factual findings. Although the involve-
ment of these persons is justified by the 
need to provide "expertise", in fact, 
more often than not they lack expertise 
in the particular area of medical prac-
tice at issue. Likewise, the review by 
DMQ, although it consists of a majority 
of practicing physicians, is likely not 
to involve a review by those with medi-
cal expertise in the particular area of 
practice involved. Although the decision-
maker should understand the expert 
testimony, he/she does not have to be 
the medical expert.16 
The judicial review process at present 
involves writ of mandate consideration 
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by any one of almost 1,000 superior 
court judges whose decisions are not 
reported and who do not normally com-
municate one with the other. The under-
standable and inevitable inconsistencies 
in their judgments are then resolved by 
a series of four different district courts 
of appeal. Where there are conflicts at 
that level, final resolution may occur by 
petition review of the Supreme Court. 
However, this means of achieving con-
sistency and judicial review is inefficient 
in the extreme. 
Instead of a series of decisions which 
are, in effect, going to have to be re-
peated in a six- to eight-year process 
where contested by respondents, and at 
enormous cost, we propose the follow-
ing alteration: a Medical Quality Court. 
The Medical Quality Court's judges 
would perform the same functions as 
the ALJs. They would adjudicate cases. 
Since this Court would be a part of the 
judiciary, its process would satisfy the 
constitutional right of judicial review, 
eliminating the current duplication, 
delay, and expense. 
The Medical Quality Court's hearing 
judges should be judicial officers equiva-
lent to state superior court judicial 
positions. These judges would be experts 
in administrative law and in medical 
terminology. They would communicate 
with each other and know their respect-
ive decisions in order to achieve con-
sistency. They would be legally trained, 
and specialists in this area of law both 
procedurally and substantively. They 
would be more knowledgeable than the 
ALJs who are currently assigned from a 
large pool, and more knowledgeable 
than MQRC panel members in areas of 
law. Most important, they would be 
recognized as judicial officers-as part 
of the judicial branch. This means that 
their decisions would constitute judicial 
decisions sufficient to satisfy the consti-
tutional requirements of due process. 
An administrative process that now 
takes four-and-one-half steps can be 
accomplished in two-and-one-half. 17 
Following the decision by this panel, 
the matter could then be assigned to a 
specific court of appeal now existing, 
a group of court of appeal judges so 
assigned, or a separate court of appeal 
panel specifically established for review 
purposes (should the volume of cases so 
justify). Following the review at the 
court of appeal level, there would be 
the current discretionary petition for 
review to the Supreme Court. It would 
be a one- to two-year system instead 
of the six- to eight-year system now 
in place. 
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The system we have described above 
is not just a theoretical model; it is the 
system which has been accepted by the 
State Bar for the discipline of lawyers 
and which is now being put into effect. 
In adopting this system, the State Bar 
Board of Governors surrendered its role 
in reviewing the discipline of attorneys. 
It still engages in the very important 
rulemaking process, as described above, 
but has properly deferred to an inde-
pendent, professional, and expert entity 
the determination of these questions in 
the public interest. The Bar did so at the 
price of a dues increase of $110 per 
member for discipline enhancement, in-
cluding the creation of this court system. 
L. Access to 
Information-Disclosure 
At present, no information is made 
public about a physician until or unless 
a formal accusation is filed by the Attor-
ney General. Even if a physician is the 
subject of nine ongoing investigations 
and seven malpractice actions, DMQ 
will not release that information, even 
where a consumer calls and asks for 
the current record of that particular 
physician. In fact, the consumer would 
be firmly and misleadingly told that the 
physician has "no record of discipline". 
Nor are the section 801, 802, and 805 
reports made public. 
With a single toll-free 800 number 
and a computerized CITS system that 
operates from the intake level, DMQ 
could and should provide useful infor-
mation to consumers who inquire. If 
a hospital or colleague asks about a 
physician's record, they also deserve to 
know the truth. We acknowledge that 
most complaints are without merit. This 
is true because consumers are often 
confused about the jurisdiction of the 
agency they are talking to, or about the 
legal standards that are currently effect-
ive. However, if there are one or more 
ongoing investigations designated as 
Priority I, it is unclear why that in-
formation should be concealed from 
consumers who inquire. Certainly, no 
information should be disclosed until 
the complaint has been reviewed, and it 
is determined that the matter is at least 
facially appropriate for discipline and 
that it falls into a Priority I category 
relevant to public safety. It is also 
true that any such disclosure should be 
made with the appropriate disclaimer, 
including the following elements: the 
matter is under investigation; no de-
cision has been made to file charges; 
there has been no finding of wrongdoing 
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by the physician; the matter is still 
pending inquiry. 
Patients deserve to know the whole 
truth about a physician to whom they 
entrust their lives, health, and future. 
The information has been compiled by 
public officials paid through tax dollars 
and is subject to appropriate qualifica-
tion. Where complaints have been fil-
tered from 50,000-80,000 initial calls 
made to BMQA, to approximately 6,000 
designated as complaints, to 3,000 seri-
ous enough to be submitted for investi-
gation and to be prioritized as Priority 
1, consumers should be informed upon 
request that the physician they inquire 
about is the subject of such an investi-
gation. Further, if there is a malpractice 
filing or a criminal arrest, both are mat-
ters of public record, and the DMQ 
(which should be gathering that informa-
tion as described above) should reveal 
that as well to any consumer upon re-
quest, again with the appropriate dis-
claimer. 
M. Resources 
Under Business and Professions Code 
section 2435(e)(3), BMQA is authorized 
to assess its members dues sufficient to 
accomplish its statutory tasks. The re-
newal fee it currently requires of most 
licensees is set at $290 every two years 
( as of 1989). The previous level was 
$255 every two years. The amount was 
raised from $255 to $290 not in order 
to add new enforcement personnel posi-
tions, but simply to keep the current 
reserve balance surplus at a level equiva-
lent to four months of agency spending. 18 
That is, the minimal increase that occur-
red in 1988 was accomplished for techni-
cal budgetary reasons and not to create 
any new positions in licensing or discipline. 
The minutes of the DMQ meeting 
on December 2, 1988 in San Diego illus-
trate the candor with which the staff 
has been attempting to apprise the Div-
ision, the Board, and the current state 
administration of DMQ's problem. To 
quote Enforcement Chief Vern Leeper: 
"However, even though these [enforce-
ment] vacancies have been filled, it does 
not mean that enforcement program is 
out of the red. As far as cases in the 
backlog, the program has been in the 
red for a couple of years and it doesn't 
look like things are going to get any 
better." Mr. Leeper described a backlog 
in excess of 700 cases statewide, pri-
marily in Orange County, Los Angeles 
County, and in the Bay area. Leeper 
continued: "The enforcement program 
has attempted over the years to acquire 
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more staff. They have had studies done 
by the Little Hoover Commission, the 
Department of Finance, and a study 
contracted with Arthur Young and Com-
pany. Unfortunately, for the last eleven 
years, these studies have not helped get 
additional staff, with the exception of 
two investigative positions to work sur-
veillance cases in 1979. At one time 
additional staff was obtained to work 
licensing fraud cases when the influx of 
licensing fraud cases hit California. The 
positions were limited terms and the 
enforcement unit has been able to retain 
one permanent position." 
BMQA requested ten additional posi-
tions in fiscal year 1986-87. All ten 
were refused. Subsequent smaller re-
quests have been similarly cut from the 
budget by the Governor's Department 
of Finance. It appears that DMQ has 
essentially thrown up its hands follow-
ing the 1986-87 denials. At its meetings, 
its staff and members bemoan these 
irresponsible decisions of the Depart-
ment of Finance, and then resign them-
selves to the outcome. Requests since 
1986-87 have been generally sequentially 
smaller up to the present budget. DMQ's 
self-surrender creates a Catch-22 which 
is as much an abdication as the ill-
advised denials of the Governor's budget 
officials. DMQ is mandated to carry out 
a legislative directive and has been strait-
jacketed into paralysis. Its response 
should not be a quiet whimper but a 
steadily rising cry of alarm, buttressed 
by candid confessions of resource im-
potence and increasing demands for the 
necessary positions. 
It is particularly ironic that physi-
cians pay but $145 per year in renewal 
fees. This is approximately the same 
amount of money that lawyers added to 
their dues in 1988 to achieve the current 
$417 per year figure they are now pay-
ing, primarily for discipline. BMQA 
identifies 57% of its budget as allocated 
for discipline (in addition to a properly 
allocated portion of its overhead). The 
Bar, with a licensee base and complaint 
level approximately 50% higher, is now 
spending over three times more than are 
physicians on their discipline system. 
We recommend that renewal fees for 
physicians should be approximately 
doubled as soon as possible. An addi-
tional $8-9 million is required to imple-
ment the Medical Quality Court system, 
to retain the services of the assigned 
supervising deputy AG and full-time 
staff AGs, and to provide sufficient in-
vestigative resources to enable this 
agency to accomplish its assigned tasks. 
The additional resources-in conjunction 
with the efficiency-enhancing changes of 
centralizing intake, placing the system 
under the control of those with exper-
tise, diminishing the number of adjudica-
tive steps from four to two, and the 
other changes discussed herein-would 
make a marked difference in the quality 
of DMQ's output and of medical care 
delivery in California. 
What is most puzzling about the fail-
ure of the current discipline system is 
that it costs the doctors who support it 
money. For most medical practitioners, 
current malpractice premiums range 
from $20,000-$80,000 per year, depend-
ing upon specialty. Using a fairly typical 
figure of $50,000, the current annual 
renewal fees devoted to funding the 
physician discipline system amounts to 
the malpractice premiums paid every 
six hours of a typical 2,000-hour work-
ing year. 
Studies in the area of attorney mal-
practice, where premiums are in the 
$4,000-$6,000 per year range, indi-
cated convincingly that expenditure 
of an additional $110 per year per 
attorney would more than pay for _it-
self in reduced insurance premiums. 
For physicians, the argument is far 
more telling. First, the premiums are 
much higher. Second, the relationship 
between malpractice premiums and 
discipline is much clearer. Unlike 
the case of attorney discipline, which 
focuses on dishonesty, BMQA discipline 
focuses on drug impairment and gross 
incompetence, directly related to claims 
payouts which form the purported basis 
for insurance premiums. Particularly 
in the context of Proposition IOJ's 
requirement of effective competition 
among insurance companies (the re-
moval of the antitrust exemption), it 
is reasonable to assume that at least 
a portion of any reduction in claims 
payouts will result in a reduction in 
insurance premiums. 
For far too long, competent physi-
cians who carry malpractice insur-
ance have been cross-subsidizing their 
less competent, drug- or alcohol-
impaired, and dishonest colleagues. 
Such is usually the case in a system 
where they themselves control the 
means for reducing those harms. In 
this case, it is in the interest of 
the public and in the self-interest 
of those physicians who are paying 
so much to eliminate the cause of 
that expense. 
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V. RECOMMENDED 
STATUTORY REFORMS 
In addition to the administrative 
changes discussed above, a number of 
statutory changes are compelled to give 
DMQ adequate authority. These statu-
tory changes or additions include the 
following: 
l. BMQA licensees should be finger-
printed at point of initial written exam-
ination and those prints retained for the 
limited purpose of entry in the Arrest 
Notification System of the Attorney 
General. (See Business and Professions 
Code section 6054 for analogous section 
pertaining to the State Bar.) This change 
allows computer entry, review, and track-
ing at point of criminal arrest rather 
than post-conviction years after the 
criminal acts. 
2. Plaintiffs filing malpractice cases 
against physicians should be required by 
the clerk of the court to show proof of 
service on BMQA. (See SB 1434 (Pres-
ley), which would amend Business and 
Professions Code section 803.) Section 
2220(c) should be amended to delete the 
word "unusually", to require the in-
vestigation of a "high" number of mal-
practice awards, and not an "unusually 
high" number. 
3. Physicians reporting disciplinable 
offenses of licensees to DMQ should 
have absolute immunity. (Requires amend-
ments to Civil Code sections 43. 7 and 
43.8.) 
4. BMQA investigators should have 
authority, with approval from either the 
deputy attorney general assigned to over-
see DMQ discipline, or by the DMQ 
Chief of Enforcement, to utilize one-
party consensual wiring or taping as 
defined in Penal Code section 633 with-
in the scope of enforcing the disciplin-
ary statutes within DMQ jurisdiction. 
(Requires amendment of Penal Code 
section 633.) 
5. DMQ should have authority to 
require competency examinations upon 
reasonable suspicion of incompetence 
liberally defined, including a single act 
of negligence. Current law requires a 
pattern of acts, death, or serious injury 
from a single act before competency can 
be tested. (Requires amendment to Busi-
ness and Professions Code section 2292.) 
6. DMQ should have authority to 
flunk a physician in an oral competency 
exam where two of three examiners fail 
to pass the examinee. At present, two 
examiners hear the test and both must 
vote to fail, followed by a second exam-
ination where both must again vote to 
fail the physician, or he/ she is deemed 
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to have passed. (Requires amendment 
to Business and Professions Code sec-
tion 2293.) 
7. All licensees should be required 
to inform BMQA whenever: 
(a) they are charged with a felony 
offense, or with a misdemeanor involv-
ing the unlawful possession, sale, or use 
of alcohol or dangerous and restricted 
drugs; or 
(b) they are subject to disciplin-
ary charges by any other California 
agency or by physician discipline juris-
dictions outside of California (see the 
State Bar version at Business and Profes-
sions Code section 6068(n)). 
8. Business and Professions Code sec-
tion 805 should require automatic report-
ing of the circumstances of all denials, 
suspensions, restrictions, or revocations 
of hospital privileges, broadly defined, 
including all resignations. Failure to 
report should not be a criminal offense, 
but should give rise to civil penalties in 
actions brought by the Attorney General 
of up to $5,000 per violation, to be 
collected by BMQA for inclusion in its 
enforcement fund. Intentional evasion 
of the statute should be a misdemeanor/ 
felony "wobbler." (Requires amendment 
to Business and Professions Code sec-
tion 805.) 
9. Coroners should be required by 
law to report any indication of physician 
error, incompetence, or negligence to 
DMQ, and should be given absolute 
civil immunity for such reporting. 
10. Probation reports in criminal 
matters concerning licensees should be 
sent automatically to BMQA. At present, 
they are sealed after thirty days and 
DMQ often does not see them. 
11. All felony preliminary hearing 
transcripts concerning defendant licens-
ees should be sent automatically to 
BMQA. 
12. The Attorney General should 
have the authority to obtain the im-
mediate involuntary suspension from 
practice of a licensee who is an im-
minent threat to patient health by 
noticed motion before the proposed 
Medical Quality Court. The burden 
should shift to the licensee to show 
cause why such interim suspension 
should not be ordered where: 
(a) A pattern of negligent 
behavior involving two or more separate 
acts threatening the health or safety of 
two or more members of the public is 
established; or 
(b) The licensee is convicted of 
a felony or misdemeanor involving alco-
hol, drugs, or sexual misconduct; or 
(c) The Medical Quality Court 
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has issued a decision recommending 
license revocation. 
(See current Business and Professions 
Code section 6007(c) provisions as 
model; see also current sections 2313, 
2236 and 2237 of the Medical Practice 
Act.) 
13. The authority of the Medical 
Quality Court should include broad 
powers to grant remedies short of li-
cense revocation and suspension in 
interim proceedings for the protection 
of the public; e.g., provisions requiring 
immediate supervision of certain proced-
ures by another licensee, immediate con-
tinuing education and retesting, et al. 
(See Business and Professions Code sec-
tion 6007(h) as model.) 
14. Although the current "clear and 
convincing" test for license suspension 
or revocation should remain, DMQ 
should have authority to obtain direct 
orders by interim or final proceedings 
short of such sanctions by a "preponder-
ance of the evidence" test. Hence, if an 
interim order or final order is directly 
imposed (not as a probationary term 
under a revocation or suspension order) 
which requires drug testing, continuing 
education, reexamination, or supervision 
of certain procedures, such an order 
could be entered upon meeting the "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" test. 
15. BMQA should be authorized to 
assess disciplined licensees the "reason-
able costs of investigation, hearing and 
review," and the costs of probation 
supervision as well. (See Business and 
Professions Code section 6086.10.) 
16. BMQA should be subjected to a 
statutory goal to eliminate the present 
backlog, to preclude future backlogs, 
and to conduct all investigations within 
six months, except for complex economic 
cases which should be investigated with-
in one year. (See Business and Profes-
sions Code section 6140.2.) 
17. A Complainants' Grievance Panel 
should be established to audit classifi-
cations of intake as not complaints, 
decisions not to proceed to accusation 
of designated complaints, and the appro-
priateness of penalties imposed prior to 
accusation and before the process is sub-
ject to public scrutiny. (See Business 
and Professions Code section 6086.8.) 
18. Section 2228 of the Medical Prac-
tice Act should be amended to add sub-
section (e), requiring a licensee on 
probation or subject to a direct order 
limiting practice to notify patients of 
that status and those conditions. 
19. Sections 2229 and 2344 should 
be amended to clarify that priority is 
given to protection of the public and 
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not rehabilitation, and that revocation 
or protective license restrictions are the 
presumed remedy for any licensee who 
has been previously disciplined, is on 
probation, or who has been or is in a 
substance abuse diversion program. 
20. Section 2227 should be amended 
to make it clear that all discipline-
whether imposed pursuant to public pro-
ceeding, agreed to, or imposed in the 
secret proceedings prior to filing of an 
accusation-be made public, including 
warning letters and conferences. 
21. Section 2234(c) should be amended 
to delete the word "repeated." Even one 
negligent act may appropriately result in 
some discipline under the lenient terms 
of subsections (c), (d), and (e). 
22. Section 2313 should be amended 
to require more complete reporting of 
DMQ performance to the legislature, 
including the following: number of con-
sumer calls received; number of con-
sumer calls or letters designated as 
discipline-related complaints; number of 
calls resulting in complaint forms sent 
to complainants and number returned; 
number of section 800 reports by type; 
coroner reports received; referrals from 
other agencies, respectively; number of 
complaints and referrals closed, referred 
out, or resolved without discipline, re-
spectively, prior to accusation; number 
of accusations filed and final disposition 
of accusations through DMQ and court 
review, respectively; number of cases in 
process more than six months from re-
ceipt of information concerning the 
relevant acts by DMQ to filing of accu-
sation; average and median time in pro-
cess from original receipt of complaint 
by DMQ for all cases at each stage of 
discipline and court review, respectively; 
number of persons in diversion, and 
number successfully completing diver-
sion programs and failing to do so, 
respectively; number of licensees interim 
suspended or subjected to interim prac-
tice limitations pending final discipline, 
respectively; probation violation reports 
and probation revocation filings and dis-
positions; number of petitions for re-
instatement and their dispositions; 
caseloads of investigators for original 
cases and for probation cases, respect-
ively. 
23. Section 2307 should be amended 
to require at least a three-year period 
before a physician may petition for re-
instatement. At present the waiting peri-
od is only one year from the DMQ 
decision. 
24. Section 2344 should be amended 
to require that a quorum of the diver-
sion evaluation committees established 
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under section 2342 must include at least 
one public member. 
25. Section 2354 should be amended 
to provide that any failure to comply 
with the diversion program shall result 
in license revocation unless "the likeli-
hood of successful rehabilitation clearly 
outweighs the threat of harm to patients 
which might occur as a result of the 
impairment." 
26. A section should be added to the 
Medical Practice Act allowing sworn 
testimony in other proceedings to be 
used in discipline matters where the 
licensee was represented by counsel and 
had reasonable opportunity to cross-
examine. (See AB 2948 (Floyd) from 
1988.) 
27. A section should be added to the 
Medical Practice Act providing that a 
civil negligence judgment is conclusive 
proof of negligence for purposes of dis-
cipline. 
28. A Medical Quality Court should 
be created, consisting of three judges 
appointed by the Governor, paid at 
superior court levels, and subject to all 
of the status and protections of judicial 
officers in every respect. These judges 
would handle all hearings, motions, pro-
bation revocations, petitions for re-
instatement, and other proceedings of 
the DMQ discipline system. The judges 
would individually try cases arising only 
from DMQ and DAHP, with possible 
later expansion to medical discipline 
cases of the Board of Osteopathic Exam-
iners, the Board of Chiropractic Exam-
iners, the Board of Pharmacy, and the 
Board of Dental Examiners. 
The Court would serve as a one-step 
AP A and judicial proceeding, following 
the format of the AP A, but with the 
Court substituting for the ALJ and 
agency. The statute would cross-refer-
ence AP A adjudicatory procedures. 
29. Appeals of decisions by the Medi-
cal Quality Court should be to a desig-
nated court of appeal, such as the Third 
District Court of Appeal in Sacramento, 
or to a special panel of judges selected 
by the Supreme Court for review pur-
poses. This court would review using 
the "substantial evidence" test, thus 
satisfying due process judicial review 
requirements. 
30. In order to finance the resources 
necessary to diminish the backlog and 
to otherwise improve the system, re-
newal fees should be increased from 
$145 per annum to $285 per year. The 
additional $140 per licensee should yield 
approximately $12 million per annum 
and should be spent on payment of full 
salaries and overhead contribution for 
no fewer than 30 deputy attorneys gen-
eral to be specifically assigned for 
BMQA investigation, supervision, and 
prosecution; an increase in the number 
of BMQA investigators from 40 to 70; 
the creation of a centralized intake 
system; enhanced computerization and 
information receipt; enhanced investi-
gative resources and support staff; and 
the establishment of a Medical Quality 
Court with three initial judges and attend-
ant clerks and facilities (two judges in 
Los Angeles and one in San Francisco). 
Our experience with discipline systems 
leads us to estimate the following costs: 
I. AG unit: $4.8 million 
2. Investigators: $3.5 million 
3. Centralized intake: $1.2 million 
4. Enhanced 
computerization 
information receipt: $I.I million 
5. Enhanced investigative 
resources: $900,000 
6. Medical Quality 
Court: $650,000 
7. Additional administrative 
overhead: $1.9 million 
Although the numbers total $14 mil-
lion, most of the changes will save sub-
stantial money, including the Medical 
Quality Court and other measures, suffi-
cient to reduce current expenses by $2.3 
million, while accomplishing effectively 
a doubling of current enforcement. 
It is recommended that five of the 
deputy attorneys general and ten of the 
added investigators be assigned to a 
special vertical prosecutions unit hand-
ling complex and difficult cases, and 
that deputy attorneys general be paired 
with investigators along specialized 
teams (incompetence in major substan-
tive areas, misprescribing, et al.). 
It is also recommended that BMQA's 
budget process be altered from a bi-
ennial renewal process to an annual 
process. Annual review by the policy 
and fiscal committees is appropriate to 
ensure effective expenditure of special 
fund monies which are passed on to 
consumers as an indirect tax. 
31. Budget control language should 
be included which prohibits caseloads of 
more than 50 probationers or more than 
25 diversion program participants per 
investigator. 
32. Budget control language should 
be included which requires BMQA to 
spend no less than 5% of its annual 
budget on affirmative public outreach 
programs informing consumers "how to 
complain about a doctor" or otherwise 
proactively detecting violation of stat-
utes or standards. 
j 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
We have omitted discussion of numer-
ous bits of evidence in this initial Report: 
the analyses of hospital discharges by 
California Medical Review Incorporated; 
the MQRC Council Report (the Weis-
man Report), attempting to analyze why 
11 of 21 cases of recommended disci-
pline by MQRC hearing were not adopt-
ed by DMQ; the Little Hoover Commis-
sion's recent report on the quality of 
medical care in nursing homes; 19 and 
the recent warning sounded by the Legis-
lative Analyst about the lack of re-
sources and the backlog. There are 
numerous procedural infirmities we have 
not addressed in detail-for example, 
the "Physician Peer Counseling Panels" 
(PPCPs) now proposed not only for 
"misprescribing" physicians, but for 
"substandard practice" of medicine as 
well. There is also the fact that if DMQ 
determines that a local panel hearing a 
discipline case is too lenient, the result 
is a DMQ review-which takes almost 
one year, during which there is no pen-
alty imposition whatever. There is the 
fact that even the rare revocations last 
only one year, when reinstatements may 
be pursued. Most petitions for reinstate-
ment are granted within three years. 
But cumulative and repetitious recita-
tion is unnecessary where the break-
down is as in extremis as it is here. The 
focus of this Report is on the large 
questions where reform would render 
moot specific defects. In fact, further 
detail only serves to distract from the 
basic reforms which are here compelled 
and for which support should be forth-
coming not only from public officials 
but from the profession itself. It is cost-
ing the profession money-and lots of 
it. And it will cost more and more. The 
failure to purge the incompetent, the 
drug/ alcohol-impaired, and the dis-
honest from the profession will result 
in further dramatic increases in mal-
practice premiums already at onerous 
levels. Nobody gains from the current 
malaise: the victims of malpractice 
would rather have their health, the 
physicians would rather not pay these 
premiums, and the public would rather 
not pay for unpredictable care at prices 
inflated by the malpractice premium 
pass-through. 
The current system is mired in an 
"old boys club" mentality. It is frag-
mented, clogged, slow, embarrassingly 
solicitous of the profession, and pro-
duces virtually nothing. Quite literally, 
its final output in revocations makes it 
less of an effective remedy for public 
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protection than does the current rate of 
death from natural causes of those who 
should be disciplined. 
The answer lies in an effective sys-
tem of detection, quick action where 
there is imminent harm, professional 
and thorough investigation, fair hearing, 
and the excision or limitation of those 
causing professional costs and public 
harm. Part of the current cartel system 
will have to give up its impeding terri-
tory in discipline. DMQ should focus 
on the critical area of policy- and rule-
making: the setting of standards, alloca-
tion of resources, and review of perform-
ance, for which it is appropriately 
constituted. Volunteer physicians should 
have important roles, especially as ex-
pert witnesses and probation monitors. 
The system proposed involves a pro-
fessional, informed, independent struc-
ture in which the public can have con-
fidence-professional supervision of 
intake, enhanced detection of misbe-
havior, early intervention where needed, 
adequate resources, and a two-step ad-
ministrative process of quality that com-
bines independence and judicial review 
with expertise. We suggest a one- to 
two-year system instead of the six- to 
eight-year system currently extant. We 
suggest production. We suggest consist-
ency. We suggest deterrence. Combined 
with a workable diversion program, pre-
ventive measures in the competence area, 
and effective probation monitoring, we 
would expect malpractice premiums to 
drop many, many times more than the 
relatively trivial $140 per year estimated 
as its cost. Indeed, an impact of less 
than one-fourth of l % on average mal-
practice premiums would pay for the 
entire increase proposed. 
The structure proposed has a prece-
dent: the California State Bar has al-
ready reduced its backlog to below the 
total levels of DMQ, and is on track to 
a model system of discipline by 1990. 
We have reason to be at least as demand-
ing of physicians as of attorneys. Those 
who argue that the reforms are inappro-
priate for physicians because attorney 
discipline is somehow "different" are in 
error. There are differences to be sure, 
but they do not relate to the process for 
judging incompetence, impairment, or 
honesty. Both systems deserve fairness, 
authority, and resources to accomplish 
similar ends. The basic mechanisms to 
achieve these results are the same: com-
prehensive intake, detection of patterns, 
interim suspension powers, adequate and 
timely investigations, expeditious hear-
ing and review. How should physicians 
differ from this model? Why? 
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Two hundred forty-nine (249) section 
805 reports were generated in 1987-88, 
representing hospitals denying or sus-
pending hospital privileges for physicians 
for medical incompetence reasons. Separ-
ate from these reports, over 700 physi-
cians suffered malpractice awards or 
judgments against them of over $30,000. 
During the same period, BMQA revoked 
27 licenses. Only 12 physicians were dis-
ciplined-revocation, suspension, or even 
straight probation-for incompetence. 
These are not our numbers. These are 
BMQA's numbers. The agency is not 
doing its job. It is so moribund it is 
unclear why it should continue at all in 
its current form. For its malaise, good 
physicians pay a heavy price, and con-
sumers pay a heavier one. 
FOOTNOTES 
I. CPIL's initial report was sub-
mitted in draft form to BMQA staff for 
comment prior to its release. BMQA's 
response was detailed, gracious, and con-
structive. It was carefully considered in 
the formulation of the final report re-
leased on April 5, 1989. That review 
implies no responsibility for the content 
of the report or agreement with its con-
clusions. 
The condensed version printed here 
excludes substantial exhibits and foot-
noted information and substantiation. 
The complete version of the report is 
available from CPIL's San Diego office. 
2. In March 1989, DMQ adopted a 
new priority system, which is discussed 
infra in Section IV(H). 
3. These numbers exclude those phy-
sicians subjected to conferences or advice 
from Regional Medical Consultants or 
others. These discipline outcomes are 
"confidential", involve no enforceable 
limitations on practice, are not subject 
to probation monitoring, and are un-
known to consumers and colleagues. 
4. See Palarea, Its Time to Elimin-
ate the "Conspiracy of Silence" Pertain-
ing to Impairment, 69(3) Federation 
Bulletin 74, 75 (March 1982); Talbott, 
Impaired Physicians Program, 73(3) 
Federation Bulletin 67, 69 (March 1986). 
See also San Jose Mercury News, Oct. 
20, 1986, § I, at 11 A; Los Angeles 
Times, Sept. 20, 1985, § V, at 19; Los 
Angeles Times, May 24, § V, at I. 
Dr. James H. Sammons, Executive 
Vice President of the AMA, agreed in 
his May 4, 1989 letter to the author: 
"Responsible clinicians and researchers 
in the field believe that the most reliable 
data on [physician impairment] incidence 
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closely parallel those for the general popu-
lation-that is, 10% of all adults will 
have difficulty with alcohol or drugs at 
some point in their lifetimes. There is no 
reason to believe that the incidence in 
the physician population would be sub-
stantially different." 
5. See, e.g., Miller v. BMQA, 193 
Cal. App. 3d 1371 (1987), which involved 
acts showing serious mental incompe-
tence in the late 1970s, a BMQA disci-
plinary order on December I, 1981, and 
a final affirmation on July 3 I, 1987; 
Kearl v. BMQA, 189 Cal. App. 3d 1040 
(1986), in which an anesthesiologist ex-
hibiting gross incompetence in 1975 was 
investigated for five years; an accusation 
was filed on October 15, 1980; a DMQ 
decision was made on April 30, 1984, 
and upheld by the court on November 
5, 1986-eleven years after the com-
plained-of acts. These two examples are 
typical of current timelines, during which 
medical practice continues. Note that 
the actual time between receipt of infor-
mation and final discipline averages just 
under four years. However, these out-
comes include stipulated discipline. 
Where discipline is resisted, the average 
time between the acts giving rise to dis-
cipline and final discipline exceeds seven 
years. 
6. See California Regulatory Law-
Reporter Vol. 8, No. 4 (Fall 1988) pp. 
36-37 for details on AOR's report. 
7. The Medical Injury Compensation 
Reform Act was added by AB I XX in 
1975. 
8. The number of physicians subject 
to hospital privilege denial or withdrawal 
in 1987-88 was 249, nine times the num-
ber whose licenses were revoked by DMQ 
over the same period (see Table 3). 
9. See Civil Code sections 47, 43.7, 
43.8. 
10. The primary incentive for an in-
stitution to suspend or revoke the privi-
leges of a practitioner has to do with 
its own perception of its liability, and 
its competitive and professional injury 
should that practitioner continue associ-
ation with the institution. However, even 
where the difficult decision to revoke 
privileges is made, there is no mechan-
ism by which a decision of one hospital 
to revoke a physician's privileges be-
comes generalizable for public protec-
tion. No matter how exhaustive and 
appropriate a decision by a hospital to 
revoke the privileges of an obviously 
incompetent or impaired practitioner, 
every other hospital or institution with 
which that physician may hold privileges 
may make its own decision. Unless DMQ 
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acts to protect the public, the only way 
an incompetent or impaired practitioner 
is barred from the practice is if every 
single private clinic and hospital makes, 
seriatim, a similar judgment. Such a pri-
vate system of limitations is fragmented 
and generally ineffective. 
11. See supra note 4. 
12. See BMQA Investigator's Man-
ual, Chapter 9 at 9-11. 
13. For background information on 
the State Bar's disciplinary system and 
backlog problems, see California Regula-
tory Law Reporter Vol. 7, No. 3 (Summer 
1987) p. I. 
14. Memorandum from Vern Leeper 
to DMQ (February 28, 1989). 
15. Legislative Analyst, Budget Re-
port for 1989-90, at 97. BMQA correctly 
notes that it requested additional posi-
tions for enforcement each fiscal year 
from 1986 to the present. It received 
over those four years 2.5 additional 
permanent positions. It has requested a 
total of seventeen positions over this 
period, ten of which were requested in 
1986-87. All were denied by the Depart-
ment of Finance before reaching the 
legislature. 
However, DMQ requests have never 
approached the numbers necessary to 
create a functioning discipline system, 
particularly during the past two years. 
Although the Department of Finance 
and the current administration rightfully 
bear substantial responsibility for DMQ's 
lack of resources, BMQA is not a "de-
partment" or "bureau" of the executive. 
As a creature of the legislature with 
quasi-independent regulatory agency 
status, it has the responsibility to take 
its case to the Department of Consumer 
Affairs and the legislature directly and 
vigorously where it is impeded from 
carrying out its statutory task. 
16. In our judicial system, judges 
who are not themselves experts listen 
and evaluate expert testimony in a variety 
of subjects, ranging from complicated 
antitrust cases to the licensing of nuclear 
power plants without being economists 
or nuclear engineers themselves. Ideally, 
according to some commentators such 
as Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, judges 
should have available to them their own 
staffs of experts to enable them to prop-
erly understand those issues. Such ex-
pert resources are available to decision-
makers under the system we propose 
herein. 
17. The current steps-MQRC/ ALJ 
hearing, DMQ hearing and review, su-
perior court writ of mandate "independ-
ent judgment" review, court of appeal 
review, and petition to the Supreme 
Court-would become hearing before 
Medical Quality Court; appeal to the 
court of appeal; and discretionary 
petition to the Supreme Court. 
18. See California Regulatory Law 
Reporter Vol. 8, No. 3 (Summer 1988) 
p. 62 for background information. 
19. See infra agency report on 
LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION for 
further information. 
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1987-88 CONSUMER COMPLAINTS 
50,000 - 80,000 calls each year 
REGION III REGION IV REGION V REGION VI 
4,685 "complaints" 
♦ 
(2) Review by Regional Medical Consultant 
(3) Review by Supervising Investigator 
in respective region 
1 
(4) 1,913 investigations opened 
(5) Assignmen~to investigator 
in respective region • (6) Review by Regional Medical Consultant 
1 
(7) Review by Chief Medical Consultant 
l 
(8) 181 cases referred to AG 
1 
25,000-45,000 calls not 
"complaints" 
case closed as "mediated 
negotiated, settled or 
dismissed" 
case referred to outside 
agency 
refer for non-disciplinary 
review 
refer to outside agency 
case closed with merit 
(insufficient evidence) 
case closed without merit 
case closed without merit 
case closed without merit 
case closed 
refer case to expert panel 
refer to MQRC for review 
informal review with 
subject (257) 
referral to MQRC 
referral to Diversion (28) 
accusation not filed 
(case closed or referred 
back for further 
investigation) 






(10) Hearing by MQRC or DMQ panel 
♦ 
(11) 92 decisions rendered 
Court Review 
( 12) Superior Court • (13) Court of Appeal • (14) Supreme Court 
TOTAL TIME ELAPSED: 6-8 YEARS 
The California Regulatory Law Reporter Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1989) 
licensees 
probation 
accusation withdrawn (18) 
accusation dismissed {12) 
accusation dismissed 
(2 other) 
case reversed, dismissed, 
mediated 
case reversed, dismissed, 
mediated 
case reversed, dismissed 
mediated 
19 
